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Overview 
 
This paper, the second in CEASA’s White Paper series on accounting issues, lays out principles under 
which fair value accounting satisfies the objective of reporting to shareholders. Its “principles-based” 
approach embraces broad economic concepts but is also pragmatic and specific enough to guide 
practice. Accordingly, the pros and cons of fair valuing bank loans, core deposits, inventories, 
investments in subsidiaries, insurance contracts, performance obligations, and debt, to name a few 
balance sheet items, are addressed. Financial statements for reporting fair values in selected industries 
are proposed at the end of the paper. 
 
Under the principles of the paper, fair value accounting for non-financial firms is largely limited to 
assets and liabilities associated with financing activities. For assets and liabilities employed in the 
business, fair value accounting typically fails to meet the principles because, under the business model, 
value is added by successfully transacting in markets rather than from fluctuations in market prices 
directly. Exceptions involve cases where the business model involves holding rights and obligations 
whose values vary one-for-one with market prices. The application of fair values is a little more 
complicated in the case of financial institutions where so-called financial assets and liabilities are 
employed in the business. But the same principles apply such that fair value is again appropriate when 
the value of these assets and liabilities varies directly with market prices rather than from their use in 
gaining customers.  
 
Two considerations confine the discussion in the paper. First, fair value accounting is evaluated for the 
purpose of reporting to shareholders. Second, the fair value measure entertained is “exit value,” as 
adopted recently by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in Statement 157 and 
entertained in discussion papers of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The first 
point forces the analysis to be pragmatic, focusing on the practical tasks of valuation and stewardship 
assessment: To what extent does fair value accounting aid or frustrate equity valuation and monitoring 
of management? The second engages the current debate: While the recent FASB Statement 157 deals 
with how fair value is to be measured – as exit value – the issue of when fair values should be applied 
is unresolved.  
 
In discussions of fair value accounting, “historical cost accounting” is typically assumed to be the 
default. In differentiating it from fair value accounting, historical cost accounting is better referred to 
as “historical transactions accounting” for it is based on reporting value added from market 
transactions rather than from fluctuations of market prices (without transactions). The paper begins 
with an analysis of how both fair value accounting and historical cost accounting in principle satisfy 
the valuation and stewardship objectives of reporting to shareholders. Advocates of fair value 
accounting often misconstrue historical cost (transactions) accounting, dismissing it as reporting “old 
costs” rather than current values. The analysis demonstrates how historical transactions accounting – 
with its emphasis on the income statement – works to inform about current value (for shareholders), 
and at the same time shows how fair value accounting – with its balance sheet emphasis – also does so. 
The analysis instructs the equity analyst for it shows that fair value financial statements are handled 
quite differently from historical cost statements in equity valuation. For example, while fair value 
accounting reports a balance sheet that is informative about value, it renders an income number that is 
uninformative about that value. However, the income statement reports on value at risk. 
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With an understanding of how both fair value accounting and historical transactions accounting work 
for valuation and stewardship reporting in principle, the paper then turns to the issue of measurement. 
Measurement is, of course, the rub of accounting and good concepts sometimes fall against the 
demands of measurement. The FASB requirement that fair value have some objective basis – backed 
up by a market price – invokes a desirable measurement standard, and is endorsed. But under what 
circumstances does fair value as exit value enhance or frustrate equity valuation and stewardship 
assessment?  
 
Here are the core ideas around which the prescriptions in the paper are built. The first three principles 
pertain to the case where prices are available in liquid markets and the last two add considerations for 
the case where fair values must be estimated.  
 
The One-to-One Principle. Fair value accounting is sufficient for shareholder reporting when 
shareholder value depends solely on exposure to market prices; that is, assets and liabilities are 
appropriately marked to fair value only when shareholder value varies one-to-one with the market 
price of those assets or liabilities. This principle means that fair value accounting is not strictly 
appropriate when a firm adds value to the market price through its business enterprise. So, for 
example, fair value accounting is appropriate for a trading security where shareholder value is 
determined, dollar-for-dollar, by the change in its market price. However, fair value accounting is not 
appropriate for raw materials where the value (to shareholders) depends not on the market price of the 
raw materials but on their use, in combination with other inputs, to produce a product that is then sold 
with value added over the market price of the raw materials. Core bank deposits do not satisfy this 
principle because they are inputs in a business model of arbitraging borrowing and lending rates rather 
than liabilities whose value arises solely from exposure to market prices.   
 
The Matching Principle. Value is generated for shareholders by combining assets and liabilities 
together according to a business plan and, correspondingly, fair value measurement applies at the level 
of the assets and liabilities that work together as a combined business group. Thus, just as an income-
statement matching principle guides historical cost accrual accounting, so a balance-sheet matching 
principle governs fair value accounting. Appropriate fair value accounting matches fair values of assets 
and liabilities in the business group together to report their total value for shareholders. So, for 
example, marking down a firm’s debt to market in response to a decline in credit quality is not 
appropriate unless the value of (often intangible) assets that gives rise to the change in credit quality is 
also marked down. Nor is the marking of bank loans to fair value without the corresponding fair 
valuing of core deposits (with their associated intangibles). Violation of this principle results in a 
mismatch of gains and losses in the income statement; thus, while fair value accounting, with the 
matching principle satisfied, appropriately reports volatility, mismatching reports “excess volatility.” 
This balance-sheet matching principle is well appreciated in fair value discussions (of the fair value 
option, for example), but its interaction with the one-to-one principle is not. So, marking bank loans to 
fair value in response to changes in interest rates requires fair valuing matched core deposits also, but 
core deposits, with their associated customer intangibles, are not liabilities whose value fluctuates one-
to-one with interest rates.  
 
The Information Conservation Principle. Fair value accounting is appropriate, as an alternative to 
historical cost accounting, only when fair value does not depend on historical transaction information. 
So, for example, substituting fair values of insurance contracts for historical transaction information 
about premiums and losses is inappropriate if the value of the insurance contracts depends on the 
premium and loss history. Further, fair value accounting is dysfunctional when it brings bubble prices 
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into the financial statements, displacing historical cost information that can challenge bubble prices. 
So, for example, fair valuing investments in a subsidiary with a bubble price (rather than using the 
equity method or proportional consolidation) loses information about the underlying profitability of the 
subsidiary that can be used as a check on the market price.  
 
The No-arbitrage Estimation Principle. This principle disciplines the use of estimates. Marking to 
model (rather than marking to market) is appropriate if the valuation model implies no-arbitrage with 
respect to observed prices or other inputs. So, for example, an estimated fair value of a stock option is 
appropriate if that estimate is derived from a model that implies no-arbitrage with respect to the 
underlying stock price. Marking to model is not appropriate where the firm arbitrages prices in the 
model. So, for example, present-value techniques such as discounting cash flow are inappropriate for 
they evaluate a firm’s ability to arbitrage current (input) and future (output) transaction prices with the 
possibility of reporting Day One profits.  
 
The Truing-up Principle. Fair values settle up against actual transactions, and appropriate fair value 
accounting correspondingly trues up against realizations. Accordingly, Last Day losses (or profits) are 
reported and systematic biases in fair value estimates are revealed. So, for example, appropriate fair 
value accounting for stock options trues up with a reporting of the gain or loss on the option on 
exercise. Accordingly, biases in grant-date option estimates and the effect of backdating are recognized 
and the full cost to shareholders is reported.  
 
The one-to-one principle is primary for, if that principle is not satisfied, the other principles are moot. 
This principle is quite constraining. It says that fair value accounting based on exit value is not 
appropriate if firms arbitrage market prices, and most business models involve the arbitrage of input 
prices (paid to suppliers) and output (exit) prices from trading with customers. So, for businesses 
where there is a customer – and the top-line notion of revenue and the bottom line notion of earnings 
(value added) from trading with customers come to the fore – fair value accounting is not appropriate. 
While the one-to-one principle is primary, it is not sufficient; if the one-to-one principle is honored, the 
other principles come into play in satisfying the objective of reporting to shareholders.  
 
The paper applies these principles to a large array of assets and liabilities. However, the paper also 
draws lessons from observing market solutions – accounting choices made under conditions where 
regulation is not imposed. Hedge funds work under such conditions (approximately) and fair value 
accounting is broadly applied for their accounting. That accounting largely endorses the five principles 
but accommodations made in the “grey areas” are instructive. These market solutions, along with the 
principles, lead to a statement of when fair value accounting is appropriate and when it is not.  
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I. Introduction to the Fair Value Accounting Issue 
 
The adoption of fair value accounting is arguably the most important and controversial issue facing 
regulators and accounting standard setters today: 
“A fundamental conceptual issue [facing accounting standard setters] is the extent to 
which the standards should move away from traditional cost based accounting to 
marking assets and liabilities to market, euphemistically referred to as ‘fair value’ 
accounting. There is without doubt considerable momentum to move toward fair value 
methodologies, but there are also significant questions about the practical and useful 
application of that approach to certain industries and firms.” 
 
-- Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Trustees, International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation 
in a statement before the Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington DC, June 7, 2001 
 
Both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have been dealing with the issue for a number of years and have 
promulgated a number of standards requiring fair value accounting for selected (largely financial) 
assets and liabilities. Some of those standards have been controversial, but the discussion today also 
involves the question of whether fair value accounting should be extended to a wider set of assets and 
liabilities now carried at historical cost. For which types of assets and liabilities are fair values 
appropriate and which are best left at historical cost? A conceptual framework that directs when fair 
value accounting is appropriate is needed, and at present none exists. 
 This paper offers a set of principles for determining when fair value accounting is appropriate 
for reporting to shareholders. The “principles-based” approach guides thought and judgment for 
specifying accounting under the overarching principle that the financial statements should mirror the 
economics of the business. But the principles are also pragmatic. While they are not explicit rules for 
application in each circumstance, they do have some specificity, some bite, so the reader can 
extrapolate to the special case; broad principles like “relevance” and “reliability,” helpful at a 
qualitative level but not at the practical level, are avoided. Accordingly, the question of fair valuing 
bank loans, core deposits, inventories, investments in subsidiaries, insurance contracts, and debt, to 
name a few balance sheet items, is resolved within the framework (although, as always in accounting, 
grey areas remain). Indeed, the paper closes with suggested financial statement layouts that summarize 
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our proposals for reporting of fair values in selected industries. A companion CEASA paper provides 
an empirical analysis of the application of fair value accounting to bank holding companies.1  
 FASB “big-picture” fair value projects to date, notably Concepts Statement No. 7 and the 
recent Standard No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, focus on how fair values should be measured.2 
The issue of when, rather than how, to apply fair value measurements – as a matter of principle – is 
unresolved, even though fair value reporting has been required for selected financial assets and 
liabilities for some time. Indeed, Standard 157, Fair Value Measurements is clear that it does not deal 
with when to apply fair value measurements.3 The FASB’s recent Standard 159, The Fair Value 
Option responds to objections to fair value accounting requirements in the earlier Statement 133 by 
granting firms a choice on whether to apply fair values, rather than resolving the issue.4 Choice 
without guiding principles leaves the accounting open-ended and can result in financial reports that are 
not comparable between firms.5 The issue of when to record fair values is on the formal agenda, 
however: Working together, the FASB and IASB have begun to review their Conceptual Frameworks 
and both “recognition” and “measurement,” the central issues in a shift from historical cost accounting 
to fair value accounting, are topics scheduled for discussion and resolution. 
 In discussions of fair value accounting people often talk at cross-purposes, so a few points need 
to be clear before proceeding. Unfortunately, this requires a considerable preamble before getting to 
the main issues.  
 
                                                 
1 See D. Nissim, Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Industry, Occasional Paper Series, Center for Excellence in 
Accounting and Security Analysis, Columbia University, 2007. 
 
2 See FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in 
Accounting Measurements (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, February 2000) and FASB Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, September 2006). 
 
3 Others have advocated fair value accounting, however. Appendix A lists arguments made both for and against fair value 
accounting by regulatory officials, professional organizations, and others.  
 
4 See FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and 
Liabilities (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, February 2007) and FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, June 1998).  
 
5 The IASB included a fair value option in International Accounting Standard No. 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement (London: IASB, December 2003). An IASB amendment restricting the fair value option was published in 
June 2005 under the title, The Fair Value Option.  
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What is Fair Value Accounting? 
Three notions of fair value accounting enter the discussion, and one must be clear on what is being 
entertained: 
1. Fair value variously applied as an alternative measurement in a “mixed attribute 
model”. 
 
In this treatment, fair value is used alternatively with historical cost for the same asset 
or liability but at different times; the accounting is primarily historical cost accounting, 
but fair values are applied under certain circumstances. Examples are fair values applied 
in fresh-start accounting and for initial measurement (that then proceeds under historical 
cost accounting), impairment from historical cost to fair value (really a form of fresh-
start accounting), and using fair values to establish historical cost (for barter 
transactions and donations, for example) or in the allocation of historical purchase price 
(between goodwill and tangible assets, for example).  
 
2. Fair value continually applied as entry value 
 
      Assets are revalued at their replacement cost, with current costs then recorded in the 
income statement and unrealized (holding) gains and losses also recognized in 
(comprehensive) income.   
  
3. Fair value continually applied as exit value  
 
Assets and liabilities are remarked each period to current exit price, with unrealized 
gains and losses from the remarking recorded as part of (comprehensive) income.  
   
Application 1 is really modified historical cost accounting; it maintains standard revenue 
recognition – applying exit prices to recognize value added from business only on actual exit of the 
product or service to the market – but with modifications to the expense matching. A write down of an 
asset from historical cost to fair value in Application 1, for example, “fresh starts” the matching to 
future revenues when anticipated revenues (to which the asset costs would otherwise have been 
matched) evaporate.6 Market values (or fair values from valuation models) might also be appealed to 
in order to discipline estimates required to effect matching under historical cost accounting (for stock 
option expense or an estimated warranty liability, for example). Revenue recognition under historical 
cost accounting is itself a matter of fair (market) value measurement, but with exit prices marking up 
                                                 
6 In FASB Statement 114 on loan impairment and Statement 121 on asset impairment, for example, the issue is whether 
recorded amounts will be recovered (in future revenues); the presumption is that assets are carried on the balance sheet to 
be matched against future revenues and so should be written down (under historical cost accounting) if those revenues are 
no longer projected. Fair values are applied for initial measurement to contributions in FASB Statement 116, mortgage 
servicing rights in FASB Statement 122, and stock-based compensation in FASB Statement 123R and IFRS 2, for example. 
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assets only when a market transaction (sale) is observed. Estimated fair values are also appealed to 
when revenue is recognized in contracts with multiple deliverables or in the case of incomplete 
performance, but again in the sprit of recognizing value added only with an exit transaction.  
Application 2 also retains revenue recognition but matches current (input) costs to (current) 
revenues to produce a measure of income that (it is claimed) is not path dependent and a better 
indication of future income. The separation of revenues over current costs from holding gains and 
losses is said to improve the reporting on the source of historical cost profits.7 FASB Statement 33 
(now suspended) was an experiment with application (2).8  
 Application 3 applies exit values to continually re-mark assets and liabilities (both up and 
down) but without actual exit (realization), so differs substantially from the other two applications. The 
FASB, in Statement 157, Fair Value Measurements endorses fair value as exit value, and the same 
measurement basis surfaces in IASB Discussion Papers subject to some reservations:9 
 “Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer 
a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date.” 
 
While the IASB and FASB presumably envision exit values being applied to determine fair value in 
the mixed attribute model in Application 1, it is Application 3 that genders the most debate. While 
there are issues to be considered in Application 1, it is the recognition of value added without an 
historical exit transaction that places this fair value accounting in such contrast to historical cost 
accounting. The top-line notion of transaction revenue disappears, and income becomes simply the 
change in fair values on the balance sheet, with those fair values based on anticipated future 
transaction revenues. Accordingly, the accounting issues are quite different. Continually remarking 
equity investments to fair value rather than using the equity method involves different issues from 
impairing equity method investments for a permanent loss under mixed attribute accounting. 
Continually marking loans to fair value is quite different from impairing loans under historical cost 
accounting because recorded amounts are deemed not recoverable. And so with marking inventories, 
                                                 
7 The classic reference to this form of accounting is E. Edwards and P. Bell, Theory and Measurement of Business Income 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). 
 
8 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33, Financial Reporting and Changing Prices (Norwalk, Conn.: 
FASB, September 1979). 
 
9 See IASB Discussion Paper, Fair Value Measurements Part 1: Invitation to Comment (London: IASB, November 2006). 
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real estate assets, core deposits, insurance contracts, debt, and so on to fair value on a continual basis. 
“Fair value accounting” as envisioned in Application 3 is a potential shift in paradigm.10 
 This white paper is concerned with Application 3, though some points bear on applying fair 
values in Application 1 (as will be noted). Application 3 may not apply to all assets and liabilities; in a 
limited application, some assets or liabilities might be carried at fair value (continually) while others 
are carried at historical cost (continually). So, marketable securities might be marked to market 
(always), with inventories carried at historical cost (always). Or, for a commercial bank, the bank book 
might be accounted for differently from the trading book. Here the issue of where to draw the 
boundary between fair value accounting and historical cost accounting comes very much to the fore. If 
the term, “mixed attribute model” is to be applied in this case, its meaning differs from that applied in 
Application 1 where fair value and historical cost are used alternatively for the same asset or liability.  
 
Fair Value for Whom? 
In accounting – and indeed in any activity of a utilitarian nature – prescriptions cannot be made (or 
agreed upon) without an understanding of the objectives of the exercise. Accounting, like any product, 
should be demand driven: What do the customers – the consumers of the reports – want? That, in turn, 
leads to the question of who are the customers. Different users may demand different accounting 
reports, and confusion reigns if issues are discussed at cross purposes.  A focused discussion of fair 
value accounting cannot begin without an answer to the question: fair value for whom? A shareholder 
might see a gain from a fall in the value of a liability as creditworthiness deteriorates, but not the 
creditor. Bank shareholders might wish to see bank deposits at fair value, but not the depositors (who 
might be startled by a drop in the book value of their claim). A bank regulator might also be concerned 
about reporting deposits at less than face value if such reporting affected depositors’ confidence in the 
banking system. While an investor might welcome the information about volatility that fair value 
accounting reveals, not so a central banker who might be concerned about feedback effects on 
systematic risk. The bank regulator might also be concerned about marking up banks’ capital during 
speculative times with the resulting incentive for profligate lending.11  
                                                 
10 Other accounting concepts such as “deprival value” and “current cash equivalents” could be referred to as “fair values” 
but these also are not entertained in this paper.  
11 Papers that deal with fair value from the view of the central banker and bank regulator include A. Enria (and others), Fair 
Value and Financial Stability Occasional Paper Series No. 13, European Central Bank, April 2004; G. Plantin, H. Sapra, 
and H. Shin, “Marking to Market, Liquidity, and Financial Stability”, Monetary and Economic Studies (Special Edition), 
October 2005; K. Burkhardt and R. Strausz, “The Effect of Fair vs. Book Value Accounting on Banks”, unpublished paper, 
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With a goal of producing general-purpose financial reports, standard setters face many such 
demands. The Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security Analysis (CEASA) prepares its 
accounting white papers with the objective of reporting to shareholders. This is hardly a controversial 
position. Shareholders are the owners to whom managers and auditors report and financial statements 
are formally presented to shareholders at the annual meeting. Indeed, accounting, as practiced, 
nominally tracks shareholders’ equity, with the closing entry each period being an update to equity, 
and the “bottom line” number, earnings per share, calculates earnings to common shareholders. 
Shareholders bear the residual risk from poor financial reporting, and income, gains, and losses are 
reported from their perspective. So ingrained is this shareholder view in the common domain, that 
reporting an increase in the market value of a firm’s debt due to a drop in interest rates as a gain – in 
order to recognize the effect of changes in fair value for creditors rather than shareholders – would be 
seen to be as preposterous as treating interest expense as income to be distributed. In a world with 
separation of ownership and control, with ownership claims valued in large volumes in capital markets 
based on accounting information, we see shareholder reporting as an imperative.  
 Accordingly, the reader must understand that the prescriptions in this paper pertain to reporting 
to shareholders of business enterprises. (We thus to not consider fair value accounting for not-for-
profit enterprises where there are no “owners’.) IASB and FASB conceptual framework proposals put 
emphasis on reporting to equity investors but, under the mantra of general-purpose financial reporting, 
typically adopt an “entity perspective” rather than a “proprietorship perspective.”12 A recent 
Preliminary Views document from the FASB, however, proposes a “basic ownership approach” (in 
effect, the common shareholder) to delineate equity versus debt.13 On many issues, the distinction is 
not important. A proprietorship perspective requires an appropriate accounting for the business entity 
that delivers value to shareholders; to the extent that fair value issues concern business assess they 
concern the shareholder. But the proprietorship perspective also requires a strict division between the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Free University of Berlin, April 2004; and “Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Some Implications for Bank 
Regulation”, BIS Working Paper No.209, August 2006.  
 
12 See IASB Discussion Paper, Preliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual Framework: The Objectives of Financial 
Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information (London: IASB, July 2006) 
and FASB, Financial Accounting Series, Preliminary Views, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of 
Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information (Norwalk, Con.: 
FASB, July 2006). 
 
13 FASB Financial Accounting Series, Preliminary Views, Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity (Norwalk, 
Conn: FASB, November 2007).  
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shareholders’ claim on entity value and those of others.14 Accordingly, a proprietorship focus is 
adopted in resolving issues of fair valuing debt and other non-equity claims. The proprietorship 
perspective is not necessarily inconsistent with accounting for all suppliers of capital but, if other 
accounting objectives are in mind, it may be that reports to shareholders must be supplemented with 
disclosures for other users.15 Our aim is not, primarily, to make recommendations to regulators who 
face a variety of constituents. Rather the aim is to design accounting for faithful reporting to firms’ 
owners.16  
 
The Approach in the Paper 
Accounting prescriptions are often statements of received wisdom and the author’s own introspection, 
combined with some a priori thinking: here is what I think about the matter, says the author, supported 
by some inductive and deductive logic. This approach, applied in the “accounting theory” era of the 
1950s to the 1970s, yielded numerous prescriptions – replacement-cost accounting, inflation-adjusted 
accounting, deprival-value accounting, and (to the issue at hand) exit-value accounting, to name a few 
– but little resolution. It would be helpful to refer to concrete research results for answers, but 
theoretical and empirical research has not delivered many definitive recommendations about fair value 
accounting either. Recent accounting-based valuation theory provides some insights that will be 
brought to the issue.  Empirical research documents correlations between fair value measurements and 
stock prices that are useful for understanding whether fair values are “relevant to investors” (and will 
be referenced in the paper), but does not give us much of a handle on the policy question of whether 
                                                 
14 CEASA White Paper No. 1 deals with the issue of accounting for debt and equity claims under a proprietorship 
perspective. See Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security Analysis, White Paper No. 1, “Debt vs. Equity: 
Accounting for Claims Contingent on Firms' Common Stock Performance, with Particular Attention to Employee 
Compensation Options” (authors J. Ohlson and S. Penman) at  http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/ceasa/research/papers. 
Also see J. Ohlson and S. Penman, “Accounting for Employee Stock Options and Other Contingent Equity Claims: Taking 
a Shareholders’ View,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Spring 2007.  
 
15 Regulators who are concerned about the effects of accounting on behavior could seek other mechanisms to modify that 
behavior. So, a bank regulator concerned about profligate lending under fair value accounting might look to other 
mechanisms (lending rules) rather than constraining the reporting to shareholders. 
 
16 While the emphasis is on the shareholders, this is certainly not inconsistent with broad, public interest criteria. The 
charge of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to promote well-functioning capital markets, embraces shareholder 
interests: Investors trade claims in capital markets and require information to ascertain the price at which to trade. Poor 
accounting results in poor share pricing; good accounting promotes efficient pricing. Legal actions are often directed at 
stewards who are alleged to have failed in their fiduciary duty to shareholders. 
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fair values should be reported in place of historical cost accounting (which, research shows, is also 
relevant to investors).17  
 This paper takes what might be called a demand approach. Accounting is a product and 
products are a matter of design. The design – and the quality of the product – should be judged on how 
well it serves the customer. So, with the customer identified as the shareholder, it asks under what 
conditions fair value accounting helps or frustrates the customer. Unfortunately, inferring demand from 
statements and opinions voiced in the current regulatory environment – or even asking people what 
they want – is difficult, because regulation modifies behavior.18 (Appendix A provides a number of 
statements made by individuals, for and against fair value accounting.) One does observe the voluntary 
application of fair value accounting (without the coercion of regulation) in some situations – 
unregulated hedge funds use fair value accounting, for example – and the paper will defer to “the 
market” for lessons. Such observations are limited, however, so some a priori assessment of the 
demand is inescapable. But this is carried out with an eye to the shareholder.  
We presume that shareholders demand accounting information for two purposes:  
1. Valuation. Shareholders use accounting information to inform them about the (fair) value of the 
equity: What is my equity stake worth? 
2. Stewardship. Shareholders use accounting information to assess the stewardship of 
management, the owners’ employees: How efficient have managers been in making 
investments and conducting operations to add value to my equity stake?   
Accordingly, the paper focuses on practical tasks for which information is (presumed to be) demanded 
and reverse engineers to the accounting that serves these tasks: To what extent does fair value 
accounting aid or frustrate the tasks of equity valuation and monitoring managers’ stewardship? The 
                                                 
17 Indeed, inferences from the empirical research are limited because stock prices, from which “relevance” is inferred, are 
determined from information under current accounting practices, and those prices might be different under alternative 
practices. For a review of empirical research on fair value accounting, see W. Landsman, “Is fair value accounting 
information relevant and reliable? Evidence from capital markets research” paper presented at the Information for Better 
Capital Market Conference, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London, December 2006, available 
(under a different title) at http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?route=144577 and published in Accounting and Business 
Research, International Policy Forum 37 (Spring 2007), 19-30. 
 
18 The cynic might ask whether there is any demand for fair value accounting. The statements in Appendix A suggest that 
fair value accounting is advocated largely by accounting regulators and academics, not users or preparers, with the financial 
community generally resisting. Note, however, that the CFA Institute representing analysts in the U.S. advocates a broad 
application of fair value accounting (though there appears to be considerable disagreement with this position among 
practicing analysts); see CFA Institute, Center for Financial Market Integrity, A Comprehensive Business Reporting Model: 
Financial Reporting for Investors (CFA Institute, 2006).  A PricewaterhouseCoopers’ survey found investors to be 
skeptical of fair value accounting for operational assets; see Measuring Assets and Liabilities: Investment Professionals’ 
Views (PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, February 2007).  
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first task is that of the equity analyst; the second concerns custodians involved in corporate governance 
on behalf of shareholders. The valuation objective is consistent with the IASB and FASB objective of 
providing information to investors about future cash flows (on which value is based).19 In their 2006 
preliminary views of the Conceptual Framework, the two boards choose not to state stewardship as a 
separate reporting objective, feeling that it is implied in the banner objective of reporting information 
for making investment decisions. Without engaging this issue, the stewardship objective is explicit 
here because fair value accounting particularly bears on the issue. 
We proceed by first identifying product features of fair value accounting that satisfy the 
objectives. We ask (in the next section): What would fair value accounting have to look like to be a 
high-quality product? We then introduce five accounting principles that must be honored for fair value 
accounting, based on exit prices, to have the desired features. In their breach these principles define 
imperfect fair value accounting; violation of the principles means that the accounting is less useful 
(and possibly misleading) for valuation and stewardship assessment.  
 
Limitations of the Paper 
Products are chosen against alternatives so, without prejudice to other measurement approaches, the 
paper compares fair value accounting to historical cost accounting, the current default. But the 
comparison is incomplete. The next section compares product characteristics of fair value accounting 
and historical cost accounting, but that comparison pertains to their implementation in an ideal form 
where both are sufficient for satisfying the valuation and stewardship objectives. Practical issues of 
measurement mean that ideal implementation is rarely possible, so the appropriate comparison is 
between imperfectly implemented fair value accounting and historical cost accounting. We make no 
such comparison. We identify principles, the violation of which renders fair value accounting 
inappropriate relative to the ideal, but do not make a comparison between the resulting imperfect fair 
value accounting and the (presumably inevitable) imperfect implementation of historical cost 
accounting (whether it be the current GAAP version or otherwise). The contribution of the paper is 
thus modest. One understands from the stated principles the conditions under which fair value 
accounting has the desired product characteristics but the paper does not offer a corresponding set of 
principles that define well-implemented historical cost accounting. One understands when fair value 
                                                 
19 See IASB discussion paper, Preliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual Framework, op. cit., and the corresponding 
FASB document, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, op. cit., paragraphs OB2 and OB3. 
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accounting fails to satisfy the product objectives but one cannot conclude from the paper that a 
particular implementation of historical cost accounting supplies the remedy.  
While we take a product perspective and run through a number of scenarios, we must stress that 
we conduct no systematic product testing that would sort out these issues. Our approach points to a 
need for research that would conduct experiments or field tests for using alternative accounting 
treatments for equity analysis or performance evaluation. These tests would identify quality features, 
product failures, and side effects – that we only conjecture about here – much like a drug, after 
engineering, is taken through drug trials to avoid serious damage in the market.20 On the theory side, 
models where fair value accounting or alternatives emerge endogenously under the two stated 
objectives would be of enormous help.21 
 The paper addresses the issue of what measurements should be used in an accounting system 
that produces articulated income statements and balance sheets – the closed system distinguishing 
stocks and flows that is bedrock to economic accounting (and engineering systems more generally).22 
However, nothing in the paper necessarily detracts from the notion that financial reporting should 
provide relevant information about future cash flows. Both fair values and historical costs may do so, 
but the issue is what information should go into the accounting system – to determine the two “bottom-
line” numbers, book value of equity (stocks) and earnings (flows) on which investors and analysts 
focus – and what should be a matter of supplementary or “second column” disclosure.  So one could 
envision financial statements based on fair values, with historical cost metrics in footnotes, or vice 
versa (much like some fair value information is now disclosed to supplement historical cost income 
statements and balance sheets).  
 
                                                 
20 An American Accounting Association committee makes this suggestion in response to call for comment on the FASB’s 
Preliminary Views on the conceptual framework. See G. Benston, D. Carmichael, J. Demski, B. Dharan, K. Jamal. B. Laux, 
S. Rajgopal, and G. Vrana, "Comments by the American Accounting Association's Financial Accounting Standards 
Committee on the FASB's 'Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting', Call for Preliminary Views, July 6, 2006", 
Accounting Horizons, June 2007, 229-239.  
21 Papers that embark on the endeavor include X. Zhang, “On Accounting Valuation of Corporate Assets,” working paper, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2002 and  A. Choy, “Fair Value as A Relevant Metric: A Theoretical Investigation,” 
working paper, University of Alberta, 2006. 
 
22 See A. Klamer and D. McCloskey, “Accounting as the Master Metaphor of Economics,” The European Accounting 
Review 1 (May 1992), 145-160. 
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Outline of the Paper 
Fair value accounting and historical cost accounting can be evaluated only with a clear understanding 
of their product features. So Section II of the paper lays out how the two work to convey information 
about valuation and stewardship.  
 With this understanding, Section III presents five principles which determine whether fair value 
accounting has the desirable product features. Appropriate fair value accounting honors these 
principles and approximations are judged by the extent to which they depart from these principles. 
Section IV then recognizes some practical considerations under which such approximations might be 
entertained.   
 Market behavior tells us how people behave in the exercise of their own free will, without the 
coercion of regulation. Section V asks what is to be learned from the practice of fair value accounting 
in situations where it is adopted voluntarily. 
 The five principles of Section III, along with observations of the demand for fair value 
accounting in markets, lead to a statement of conditions under which fair value accounting is 
applicable. These conditions are laid out in Section VI.  
 To conclude, Section VII provides suggested balance sheet and income statement formats for 
reporting fair values and historical costs. As the conditions for appropriate fair value accounting vary 
across assets and liability types, these dummy financial statements are provided for different industries. 
Our companion document, Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Industry, examines the application of 
fair value accounting in banking. 
 Some supplementary material is provided in two appendices. Appendix A contains some quotes 
made for and against fair value accounting by regulators, professional associations, and others. 
Appendix B shows how principles in the paper apply when valuing a brand-name firm, The Coca Cola 
Company.  
Many of the points made in this paper have been made before; indeed, some have been argued 
many times. The paper’s aim is to provide an overall conceptual framework – a cohesive set of 
principles – that stimulates orderly thinking on the issue that recognizes sound points, identifies 
fallacious arguments, and, most importantly, leads to a prescription for when a move from historical 
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II. Product Features of Fair Value Accounting and Historical Cost Accounting 
 
Fair value accounting and historical cost accounting are competing and mutually exclusive ways of 
conveying information. Their differences are by design, and that design must be understood if one is to 
appreciate what is gained or lost by adopting one system over the other. Arguments made, pro and con, 
often misunderstand how the two designs work. 
 Accounting reports information through balance sheets and income statements that articulate 
such that (comprehensive) income equals the change in equity in the balance sheet other than that due 
to transactions with shareholders. The system produces two bottom-line numbers, income in the 
(comprehensive) income statement and book value of equity or “net worth” in the balance sheet. Since 
income and book value articulate, the determination of assets and liabilities also determines income, 
and vice versa. Accordingly, accounting based on asset and liability recognition and measurement in 
the balance sheet produces a particular income measure, as a residual, that may be inconsistent with 
one driven by an income concept that produces a balance sheet as a residual. Fair value, with an asset 
and liability focus, differs fundamentally from historical cost accounting driven by an income concept; 
the two are mutually exclusive, so for given assets and liabilities, a design choice has to be made. The 
objection that historical cost accounting, with a focus on an income concept driven by revenue 
recognition and matching, produces assets and liabilities such as deferred charges and unearned 
revenue that are not “real” assets and liabilities as defined by an asset and liability focus, recognizes 
the inherent tension; accruing an expense for restoring a mining site against revenue from the mine, for 
example,  results in a liability even though there is no legal requirement to make the restoration.23 
 In evaluating the two alternatives, we distinguish conceptual features in the design from those 
that arise from measurement. In this section we discuss how fair value accounting and historical cost 
accounting would satisfy the valuation and stewardship goals of shareholder reporting in principle (if 
measurement were no problem), and then move on to measurement issues in Section III. The ideal 
                                                 
23 The IASB and FASB conceptual framework documents to date do not take an explicit position on a balance sheet versus 
income statement approach. However, paragraph BC1.30 of FASB Preliminary Views, Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting, op. cit. says that, to measure performance, “an entity first identifies and measures its economic 
resources and claims….then calculates the net change in economic resources and claims other than changes resulting from 
transactions with owners.” The IASB discussion paper, Preliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual Framework, op. 
cit., makes a similar statement in paragraph BC1.30. A recent CEASA Occasional Paper evaluates the balance sheet 
approach. See I. Dichev, On the Balance Sheet-Based Model of Financial Reporting, Occasional Paper Series, Center for 
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accounting in both cases are constructions of what the accounting would look like if it were perfectly 
informative (and measurement were no problem). 
 
Properties of Ideal Fair Value Accounting for Shareholders 
Fair values accounting (ideally) satisfies the shareholder reporting objective by accounting for assets 
and liabilities in the balance sheet at fair value (to shareholders). The income statement then reports 
changes in fair value calculated in the balance sheet, and no separate income concept drives the income 
statement. Accordingly, the information supplied by fair value balance sheets and income statements 
has the following properties. These features apply to a balance sheet fully marked to fair value or to a 
subset of assets or liabilities so marked (like marketable securities). 
First, the balance sheet is a complete accounting for value; the valuation objective is 
satisfied in the balance sheet. 
 
Second, earnings are uninformative about future earnings and about value; earnings are 
changes in value and as such do not predict future value changes, nor do they inform 
about value (value “follows a random walk,” as it is said)24. Claims that fair value 
accounting, by following the Hicksian definition of economic income, resolves the issue 
of income measurement must be qualified, for the concept of income, so measured, is a 
particular one. This lack of information in the income statement is of no concern, 
however, because the balance sheet gives a complete accounting for value. 
 
Third, while earnings does not inform about value, it measures periodic shocks to value 
and thus informs about risk. While a given report (for one period) yields only one 
realization on the volatility, the time-series volatility of income indicates the risk of the 
business. Objections that fair value accounting introduces volatility are thus not well 
founded; risk revelation is a desirable attribute of fair value accounting. 
 
Fourth, earnings report the stewardship of management in adding value for 
shareholders. 
 
In short, with respect to the valuation objective, fair value accounting is a perfect accounting for value 
(in the balance sheet) and provides information about risk exposure and stewardship (in the income 
statement). Accordingly, the price–to-book ratio (P/B) is always equal to one. However, the P/E ratio 
under fair value accounting has a particular interpretation. It is not a multiplier of current earnings that 
indicates earnings growth, for earnings (change in value) is a random shock that has no growth. Indeed 
there is no multiplier effect at work; earnings do not repeat in any predictable fashion. Rather, P/E 
                                                 
24 See P. Samuelson, “Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly,” Industrial Management Review, 6 
(1965), 41-49. 
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(with value in the numerator and value shocks in the denominator) is a realization of value at risk. Fair 
value accounting introduces volatility into the P/E ratio and this volatility reveals risk.  
 This description outlines fair value accounting is an ideal form as an instructive benchmark for 
evaluating what is lost in less-than-ideal fair value implementations. In practice, the accounting for 
investment funds – mutual funds and hedge funds – applies this ideal fair value accounting, and 
investors are willing to trade in and out of the fund at book value (“net asset value”) with the 
presumption that book value equals value. Further, the income (returns) for these funds is accepted as a 
comprehensive measure of the fund manager’s investment performance, both the investment success 
and the volatility to which investors have been subjected. The accounting is sufficient; one does not 
require a balanced scorecard. These funds are the prototype for evaluating fair value accounting more 
generally. We will return to these funds in Section V, for they are a case where shareholders choose 
fair value accounting voluntarily (without regulation), and choice under free will is instructive.  
 
Properties of Ideal Historical Cost Accounting  
Perhaps more than anything else, misunderstanding of historical cost accounting creates confusion in 
the discussion of fair value versus historical cost. Historical costs are said to be “old costs” not 
indicative of current values, and fair value accounting is often proposed as a remedy. However, far 
from being a design flaw, this is a design feature of a system that conveys information for valuation 
and stewardship in a very different way. Historical cost accounting is said to be “backward looking,” 
but that too ignores the design, in the form of accrual accounting principles, that makes the transactions 
history informative about the future. 
 Historical cost accounting takes the view that value is generated in business by purchasing 
inputs (from suppliers), transforming them according to a business plan, and selling the consequent 
products (to customers) over cost; in short, value is added by arbitraging input and output markets for 
goods and services according to a business plan. Historical cost accounting does not report the 
(present) value of possible outcomes from the business plan, nor the (present) value of individual 
assets. Rather, it reports on progress on execution of the plan, recognizing value added (earnings) only 
when it is actually confirmed with actual transactions in input and output markets.25 The equity analyst 
then makes an assessment of the value of the business, via projections of future earnings or cash flows 
based on the historical record of the firm’s engagement with markets. The term, “historical cost” is 
                                                 
25 The classic formulation of the design in historical cost accounting is in W. Paton and A. Littleton, An Introduction to 
Corporate Accounting Standards (Evanston, Ill.: American Accounting Association, 1940). 
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unfortunately pejorative (and compares unfavorably with the connotations of “fair value”). A better 
term, that captures the essence, is “historical transactions accounting,” for the accounting reports a 
history of transactions from engaging with markets and the value added from that engagement, with a 
recognition of the principle that expenditure is cost.  
 Consequently, the income statement rather than the balance sheet is the primary focus under 
historical transactions accounting. The income concept is key: income is the difference between 
(market) value received from trading with customers over value surrendered by trading with suppliers. 
Revenue measures the former and expense the latter, with the difference yielding earnings. A 
realization principle dictates revenue recognition: Recognize revenue at exit market value but only 
when there has been an exit (of products) to market. A matching principle dictates the recognition of 
expenses: Recognize expenses that are incurred to generate revenue and match those expenses against 
revenue to yield net value added, that is, earnings. 
 With an income concept being primary, the balance sheet is the residual of the income 
statement. Business assets and liabilities are recognized on the balance sheet when there is a timing 
difference between revenues and expenses booked and the cash received or paid. Assets are usually not 
at fair value, by design, but rather arise as a product of matching; assets are not viewed as something 
that will produce future cash flows (from customers) but as something that will be used up in 
producing those cash flows (with the consequent loss in value matched as an expense). (The exceptions 
are assets, like receivables, that arise from revenue recognition). Liabilities such as accrued expenses, 
unearned revenues, and deferred taxes gaining legitimacy from the income measurement process rather 
than necessary representations of the value of obligations to others.26 Adding financing assets and 
liabilities (marketable securities that store excess cash and obligations to those providing debt 
financing) completes the balance sheet, with the residual of assets over liabilities going to equity.  
 Accordingly, the information supplied by historical cost balance sheets and income statements 
has the following features: 
First, the balance sheet does not provide complete information about value.  
 
Second, earnings provide information about value by reporting value added from 
trading with customers and suppliers. Whereas fair value earnings are uninformative 
about future earnings and value, historical cost earnings inform because they predict 
future earnings on which value is based.  
                                                 
26 This does not mean that historical cost items do not have “asset” and “liability” interpretations. A deferred charge has 
future benefits in the future revenues that it generates (and against which it will be matched). Unearned revenues are 
obligations to customers, with the gains from performing on these obligations not recognized until the obligations are 
satisfied. 
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Third, historical cost conveys limited information about value at risk. Rather than 
shocks to value, earnings convey shocks to revenues and expenses, that is, information 
about the risk of trading in input and output markets. 
 
Fourth, earnings measure the stewardship of management in arbitraging input (supplier) 
markets and output (customer) markets; managements are judged by their effectiveness 
in transacting in markets.  
 
In short, historical transactions accounting is an imperfect accounting for shareholder value in the 
balance sheet but provides information for valuation and risk exposure in the income statement. 
Accordingly, the price–to-book ratio (P/B) typically is not equal to one. The difference between equity 
value and the book value of equity (the amount of value that is omitted from the balance sheet) 
represents expected future earnings that will be added to book value in the future when income is 
recognized according to the revenue recognition and matching principles. So the omitted value is 
determined by forecasting future earnings; the analyst completes the valuation by adding forecasts of 
future earnings to book value, and current earnings serve to forecast those future earnings. (Appendix 
B has a demonstration.) While the P/E ratio under fair value accounting has no multiplier 
interpretation, it does so under historical transactions accounting, for current earnings replicate and 
multiply (in expectation) in the future. 
 Accordingly, effective historical transactions accounting has the feature of providing 
information for forecasting future earnings. The balance sheet is deficient, so the analyst looks to the 
income statement. Whereas the income statement under fair value accounting is uninformative about 
future earnings, historical cost accounting statements, in principle, are: If the matching of revenues to 
expenses incurred to generate revenues is done faithfully, current earnings indicate the ability of the 
firm to add value from sales and so indicate earnings from future sales. In practice, current profit 
margins typically predict future margins, and considerable research documents that historical cost 
information forecasts future earnings rather well on average.27 The view that historical cost 
                                                 
27 See, for example, I. Little, “Higgledy Piggledy Growth,” Bulletin of the Institute of Statistics Oxford 4 (November, 1962), 
387-412; J. Lintner and R. Glauber, “Higgledy Piggledy Growth in America?” Proceedings of the Seminar on the Analysis 
of Security Prices: Modern Developments in Investment Management (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1967); W. Beaver, “The 
Time Series Behavior of Earnings,” Journal of Accounting Research 8 (Supplement 1970), 62-99; R. Ball and R. Watts, 
“Some Time Series Properties of Accounting Income,”  Journal of Finance 27 (1972), 663-682; L. Brooks and D. 
Buckmaster., “Further Evidence of the Time Series Properties of Accounting Income,” Journal of Accounting Research 14 
(1976), 1359-1373; and R. Freeman, J. Ohlson, and S. Penman, “Book Rate-of-Return and Prediction of Earnings Changes: 
An Empirical Investigation.  Journal of Accounting Research 20 (Autumn 1982), 639-653. 
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information is “backward looking” is somewhat misconceived. Rather, historical transactions 
accounting, appropriately executed with sound matching, projects forward. 
 
The Demand for Fair Value Accounting and Historical Transactions Accounting 
A demand for fair values could be imputed if historical cost information were shown to be deficient for 
valuation and performance evaluation, with fair values providing the remedy. Measurement problems 
(in implementing revenue recognition and matching) impose upon historical transactions accounting in 
practice, as they also do on practical fair value accounting (in measuring fair values) in practice. To 
separate concepts from measurement issues, it is helpful to compare fair value accounting and 
historical transactions accounting as products implemented in their ideal form without distortion 
introduced by imperfect measurement. Measurement issues will then be introduced in the next Section. 
Two different concepts underlie the two alternatives. Can one be deemed superior in principle?   
 Ideal fair value accounting reports a book value that is sufficient to value a firm but earnings 
that are uninformative for the purpose. Ideal historical transactions accounting produces a balance 
sheet that does not report value, but earnings that are sufficient to value a firm. Consider the following 
equity valuation based on expected earnings (that is a legitimate benchmark model in valuation theory 






Value tt 1+=                                                                      (A) 
 
Here r is the required return for the equity holders. Under ideal fair value accounting, forward 
earnings are forecasted from the current book value: 
 
 Expected Earningst+1 = r × Book Valuet                                                         (B) 
 
That is, book value (ideally measured at fair value) is sufficient for forecasting earnings and for 
valuation. Under ideal historical transactions accounting earnings are forecasted from current earnings: 
 
 Expected Earningst+1 = Earningst                                                                  (C) 
 
                                                 
28 See J. Ohlson, “Accounting Data and Value: The Basic Results,” unpublished paper, Arizona State University, December 
2007, for a demonstration of the equivalence of the valuations.  
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That is, current earnings (ideally measured) are sufficient for forecasting earnings and for valuation 
(adjusted for payout).29 In the parlance of valuation theory, current earnings indicate permanent 
earnings.30 Accordingly, under historical transactions accounting equity value is determined by 





Value tt =                                                                                       (D) 
 
Under ideal fair value accounting, price is determined by reference to book value in the balance sheet: 
Value equals book value. Under ideal historical transactions accounting, price is determined by 
applying a multiplier,
r
1 , to forward earnings indicated by current earnings. 
 The lessons are clear: 
 
1. It is not necessary to state the balance sheet at fair value to satisfy the valuation 
objective. Valuations can be made from the historical cost income statement.  
 
2. Assuming that one knows the required equity return, there is no reason, in principle, to 
say that fair value accounting is better than historical transactions accounting. The 
resolution must turn on how measurement strays from the ideal. Historical cost comes 
with considerable measurement issues; does fair value measurement provide a solution? 
 
3. If one does not know the required return (and we don’t!), fair value accounting has a 
distinct advantage. Valuation under historical transactions accounting requires a 
required return (to convert earnings, a value flow, to a stock of value). Fair value 
accounting delivers the value directly from the balance sheet without relying on a 
required return (as with the mark-to-market investment fund). As a bonus, realizations 
on value at risk are reported in the income statement to give an indication of what the 
required return should be.  
 
In short, fair value accounting is a plus, implementation issues aside. However, historical 
transactions accounting has features that provide an alternative should ideal fair value 
accounting not be attainable. The oft-spoken claim that historical cost accounting reports “old 
                                                 
29 One must accommodate retention that yields additional earnings; the forecast here is for the case of full payout, but 
retention is easily accommodated by applying the required rate of return to the retained amount. See S. Penman, Financial 
Statement Analysis and Security Valuation, 3rd ed. (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2007), Chapter 6 for the 
accommodation in evaluating P/E ratios. 
 
30 Valuation under ideal fair value accounting and ideal historical cost accounting is modeled in J. Ohlson and X. Zhang, 
“Accrual Accounting and Equity Valuation,” Journal of Accounting Research 36 (Supplement 1998), 85-111. 
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costs” (in the balance sheet) rather than current values is literally true, but is a misconstruction: 
Current values can be derived from historical cost financial statements (at least in principle).  
 
EXHIBIT 1: A Valuation of The Coca Cola Company under Historical Cost Accounting 
 
To focus on a practical valuation task, Appendix B carries out a valuation of The Coca Cola Company using 
historical cost numbers. Coke has a lot of value missing from its balance sheet – its price-to-book ratio was 6.3 
at the time of the example – mainly because U.S. GAAP does not allow its brand asset to be carried on the 
balance sheet. This observation has produced charges that the accounting is poor because intangible assets are 
missing from the balance sheet, leading to proposals for booking brands to the balance sheet (as in the U.K. 
before IFRS). Appendix B shows how Coke can be readily valued with asset value missing from the balance 
sheet. To point (1) above: missing (intangible) assets in the balance sheet is no problem (for valuation) if the 
earnings from those assets are reported in the income statement. Note that the Coke case is not one where 
valuation model (D) with ideal historical cost accounting applies. That model implies a forward P/E of 10 (for a 
10 percent required return, say), but Coke’s P/E is 19.3. Nor is it a case where the forecast (C) strictly applies. 
But Appendix B shows that the imperfections of historical cost accounting can be accommodated by reference 
to historical transactions.  
 
 
A core accounting concept underlies the use of historical transactions accounting in valuation: the 
canceling error property. Provided that earnings are comprehensive (clean-surplus) earnings, it is 
always true that 
 
 Stock returnt = Earningst + (Pt - Bt) – (Pt-1 – Bt-1) 
 
where P is equity price and B is the book value of equity.31 With full fair value accounting, P = B  at 
all points in time, so earnings always equal the stock return – just like earnings for the mark-to-market 
                                                 
31 This equation first appears in P. Easton, T. Harris, and J. Ohlson, “Accounting Earnings Can Explain Most of Security 
Returns: The Case of Long Event Windows,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 (June-September 1992), 119-142, 
but textbooks of old used to discuss the canceling error property. The equation is derived as follows. The equity (stock) 
return for a period, t-1 to t, is given by 
 
 Stock returnt = Capital gaint + Dividendt 
 
            = Pt – Pt-1 + dt             
 
 The “clean-surplus” equation forces the articulation of the income statement and the balance sheet: 
 
 Bt = Bt-1 + Earningst – Dividendt                                                                        
 
Substituting Dividendt = Earningst – (Bt  - Bt-1) into the stock return equation,  
 
 Stock returnt = Earningst + (Pt - Bt) – (Pt-1 – Bt-1). 
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investment fund always equal the market return on the assets (cum-dividend). However, P = B is not 
necessary; if P – B is the same at the end of the period as at the beginning, earnings still equal the stock 
return. That is, if (Pt – Bt) = (Pt-1 – Bt-1), then Stock returnt = Earningst. 
  The equation instructs on an important accounting principle: 
  If error in the balance sheet is the same at the beginning and end of an 
                         accounting period, historical cost earnings equal the stock return 
 
(The balance sheet error is a value error only if price equals value – market efficiency − which is the 
presumption for mark-to-market fair values, as discussed in the next section.) Historical cost reports a 
balance sheet with error, but the focus is on earnings. We teach the canceling error property in 
introductory accounting courses by pointing out that earnings is the same whether one expenses R&D 
immediately or capitalizes it and amortizes, provided there is no growth; that is, balance sheet errors 
cancel. More to the point, the omission of fair value over historical cost in the balance sheet is 
mitigated by the historical-cost income statement and canceling errors. Growth changes this (and 
therefore growth introduces a change in price premium over book value). But growth can be 
accommodated in valuation, as the Coca Cola example in Appendix B shows.  
Again, it is important to emphasize that the ideal versions of fair value accounting and 
historical transactions accounting here are constructions that serve as benchmarks but which may not 
be feasible is practice. Ideal fair value accounting is practical in the case of the investment fund with 
liquid mark-to-market assets. But neither ideal fair value accounting nor ideal historical transactions 
accounting are likely to be achieved more broadly. As the 2006 FASB and IASB conceptual 
framework discussion documents recognize, accounting cannot hope to construct a perfect balance 
sheet that captures all value-relevant information. Historical transactions accounting may supply a 
remedy. However, the difficulties of historical transactions accounting are well recognized – revenue 
recognition is not straightforward with complex sale contracts, and “matching” expenses with long-
dated assets is problematic. Fair value accounting may supply a remedy. But measurement is the rub, 
so the next section turns to fair value measurement.  
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III. Five Principles 
 
While the concepts of the previous section of the paper are primary, concepts are tempered by the 
practicalities of measurement. In this section we establish principles under which fair value 
measurement, as required by the FASB, displays the product characteristics of ideal fair value 
accounting; if these principles are satisfied, fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting, 
for the reasons given in the previous section. These principles also define imperfectly implemented fair 
value accounting, in their breach. However, with the principles violated, imperfect fair value 
accounting could still dominate imperfect historical cost accounting. Section IV thus introduces some 
practical considerations where approximate fair value accounting might be entertained (with the 
principles here only approximately preserved), and Section V recognizes situations where market 
participants voluntarily use imperfect fair value accounting. 
 In Statement 157, the FASB, with acknowledgement in IASB Discussion Papers, determined 
that fair value should be measured at exit value, that is, the amount for which an asset could be sold or 
a liability could be extinguished (in an orderly market transaction). A market does not have to exist, 
however, so the reference is to possibly hypothetical market prices. Statement 157 distinguishes cases 
where market prices for the identical assets or liabilities are readily available from active markets (so-
called Level 1 measurement) and cases where hypothetical market prices have to be estimated (Level 2 
and Level 3, differentiated by an increasing degree of subjectivity in making estimates).32  
 The requirement that fair values be backed up by market prices is important, and we endorse it; 
one might argue that subjective assessment of fair values might bring the accounting closer to the ideal 
of the previous section of the paper, but without the discipline of an objective reference, the accounting 
would admit all manner of subjective assessment and even speculation. But does exit price produce 
                                                 
32 FASB Statement 157, Fair Value Measurements defines the three levels as follows: 
 
 Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) observed in an active market for identical assets and 
liabilities. 
 
 Level 2 inputs are inputs other than Level 1 quoted prices that are observable, directly or indirectly; 
examples include quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, quoted prices for 
identical or similar assets or liabilities in markets that are not active, inputs such as observed interest 
rates, credit risks, volatilities, and default rates, and inputs corroborated by observable market data by 
correlation or other means. 
 
Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs for the asset or liability, reflecting the firm’s own assumptions 
about the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the assets or liability.  
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financial reports that convey fair value to shareholders according to the ideal of the previous section?33 
Does exit price enhance practical equity analysis (valuation) and performance assessment 
(stewardship) or frustrate these tasks?  In this section we lay out five principles under which the 
answer is yes.  
 The three measurement levels frame a useful discussion.  The issue of whether exit prices 
measure value to shareholders is best handled for the case where there is no difficulty in observing 
market prices. If fair value accounting is found to be undesirable in the Level 1 case, it must be all the 
more so if fair values have to be estimated. If fair value is desirable, but there are issues about the 
reliability of estimates (in the Level 2 and 3 cases), the relevance feature must be understood to make 
the tradeoff between relevance and reliability. Issues surrounding estimated fair values are well 
appreciated; those to do with the Level 1 fair values are more subtle. The first three principles below 
are discussed with Level 1 fair values in mind; Principles 4 and 5 introduce estimated fair values. We 
make the distinction between Level 1 and the others two levels with two provisos, however. First, 
market prices in liquid markets are often “fair weather” prices; when markets come under stress, 
posted prices, representing distress trades, may not be indicative of value. Second, given that financial 
reports are published some time after fiscal-year end, exit prices incorporated in the reports are stale 
prices.   
 At this point, one must be clear on terminology. Standard setters equate fair value with 
(hypothetical) market price. This is not necessarily how shareholders see it; indeed, the pertinent 
question (which our five principles address) is whether implementation of “fair value accounting,” as 
defined by the standards setters, achieves the aim of reporting fair value to shareholders. We wish to 
address the FASB implementation of fair value accounting and in doing so we will use the term “fair 
value” to refer to that prescription – fair values as hypothetical market prices – unless otherwise 
indicated.  
 We now state five principles that bear on the adoption of fair value accounting (so defined). 
These principles are cumulative: All must be honored for fair value to meet the ideal in Section II.   
   
                                                 
33 The FASB and IASB, in their 2006 documents with preliminary views on the Conceptual Framework, op. cit., state (in 
paragraph OB20 of the respective documents) that they do not aim to show the value of an entity in the financial 
statements. This is, of course, is reasonable as rarely would one expect the financial statements to provide all information 
about value. But the issue is whether fair value accounting enhances the ability to ascertain value from the financial 
statements.  
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A. The One-to-One Principle: Fair values report value to shareholders only when 
shareholders’ welfare is determined solely by exposure to market prices 
To sharpen the discussion, the first principle is discussed under FASB Level 1 measurement conditions 
where market prices are available in liquid markets to measure exit values objectively.  
 
Consider (A) the purchase of a Treasury bill by a retailer wishing to invest excess cash. 
The firm is not a bond trader, and deems this purchase to be a zero-net-present-value 
investment (the firm is not attempting to add value to the market value price). In other 
words, the market price equals fair value to the shareholder (and historical cost equals 
fair value at the date of purchase). 
 
Consider (B) the purchase of inventory by the same retailer for resale. With the purpose 
of resale, this is a positive-net-present-value investment under her business model (she 
aims to add value to the market price). In other words, market price does not equal fair 
value to the shareholder. 
 
Consider (C) the purchase of a Treasury bill by a bond trader who assesses that the 
bond is underpriced under his business model. This is a positive-net-present-value 
investment; in other words, the market price for the purchase does not equal fair value 
(but provides historical cost).34  
 
These examples distinguish value to shareholders from fair value defined as market price. (Cases B 
and C are economically equivalent, with Case C serving only to illustrate that market value of  a given 
instrument can be fair value to shareholders in one case, Case A, but not in another, Case C.) Value to 
shareholders – the present value of expected cash flows to shareholders – is the concept in play in the 
ideal fair value accounting described in Section II.35 Clearly, market value equals fair value to 
shareholders only in the particular circumstances, in Case A but not Cases B and C.  
 The following examples extend those above to capture the dynamics (as values and prices 
change): 
                                                 
34 This case puts a fine point on the issue. See the resolution to this case in Section V.  
 
35 Value to shareholder is similar to “value in use” but with a focus on the shareholder rather than the entity.  The value-in-
use concept, or its variant, “deprival value,” appears (for example) in Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Principles 
for Financial Reporting (London: ASB, 1999), Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Accounting Theory 
Monograph No. 10, Measurement in Financial Accounting (AARF, 1998) and has long been part of the discussion, for 
example in  J. Horton and R. Macve, “ ‘Fair Value’ for Financial Instruments: How Erasing Theory is Leading to 
Unworkable Global Accounting Standards for Performance Reporting”, Australian Accounting Review 10 (July 2000), 26-
39 and R. Macve and G. Serafeim, “ ‘Deprival Value’ vs ‘Fair Value’ Measurement for Contract Liabilities in resolving the 
‘Revenue Recognition’ Conundrum: Towards a General Solution”, unpublished paper, London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE) and Harvard Business School, July 2006. 
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Consider (A1) a retailer purchases a Treasury bill as a zero-net-present value 
investment to store excess cash. The market price of the instrument rises. The retailer 
can sell the instrument at that price with certainty and sees any transaction in the 
instrument at that price as zero-net-present-value. The change in market price is equal to 
the change in value for the shareholder. 
 
Consider (B1) a retailer purchases inventory for the purpose of resale. The market price, 
observed from a transaction for the same item between a competitor and his customer, 
increases. The retailer assesses that she can find a customer at a higher price with 
probability 0.8. Accordingly, the market price is not equal to (present) value, and the 
change in market price is not equal to the change in value for the shareholder. 
 
Consider (C1a) a bond trader purchases a bond that he assesses to be underpriced. The 
market price increases to a point where the bond trader assesses it is reasonably priced 
(and thus equal to present value) and the instrument can be sold with on call at that 
price.  Market price at this point equals fair value to shareholders and the change in 
market price is equal to the change in value.  
 
Consider (C1b) a bond trader purchases a bond that he assesses to be underpriced. The 
market price decreases but the bond trader assesses that this is further mispricing of 
which his business model is taking advantage.  Market price at this point is not equal to 
fair value to the shareholder and the change in market price is not equal to fair value. 
 
Clearly, changes in market price equal value added for shareholders only in particular circumstances, 
that is in Cases A1 and C1a, but not in the other cases. 
Principle 1 (The One-to-One Principle). Fair value accounting is sufficient for 
reporting to shareholders only when shareholder value depends solely on exposure to 
market prices. Alternatively stated, fair value accounting is sufficient when the firm 
does not add value to the market price through its business enterprise.   
 
The word “solely” is important because, broadly speaking, shareholder value is tied to (input and 
output) market prices. The relationship must be one-to-one such that booking a dollar of market price 
reflects a dollar added to shareholder value.36 Fair value accounting is appropriate where an asset is 
something whose value (to shareholders) comes from changes in its market price. To state it 
differently, the balance sheet focus of fair value accounting implies that value comes from property 
rights and obligations and value is added (solely) from fluctuations in the prices of those rights and 
obligations. Accordingly, there is no “top line” notion (revenues) that is of interest. For a bond held as 
a financial asset (to store excess cash), for example, the welfare of the shareholder is entirely tied to the 
                                                 
36 The one-to-one feature is incorporated in a theoretical model of fair value accounting in A. Choy, “Fair Value as A 
Relevant Metric: A Theoretical Investigation,” working paper, University of Alberta, 2006.  
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change in its market price (and any cash interest received just reduces the market price dollar for 
dollar, so has no effect on cum-interest value). 
 To state the principle in the negative, fair value is not appropriate when a firm is arbitraging 
(adding value to) market prices, that is, buying at one price and selling at another. Historical 
transactions accounting is designed for this business model. Historical transactions accounting sees 
assets as inputs into the productive process that arbitrages input and output prices. The asset, raw 
material for example, does not accrue value as its market price changes, but as an input into a product 
that is then sold with value added. The top-line concept of revenue takes the fore – the market price 
from trading in output markets – with raw material being an input cost to subtract from revenue to 
calculated value added. For a bank, loans (assets) and deposit liabilities yield value, not from their 
market price, but as instruments in a business model that adds value from arbitraging borrowing and 
lending rates. In contrast to interest on a bond held as a financial asset – where interest adds value one-
for-one – interest on a bank loan represents value added to the bank from trading with customers, and 
thus can take on a multiplier greater than 1.0 because of customer relationships involved. Fair value 
exit price is value to others (possibly as inputs to their different value added activities), not to the 
shareholders executing a specific business plan designed for competitive advantage over others. Exit 
prices, in these cases, lose track of the business model, and the idea that fair value, as exit price, is 
“neutral” is misguided. So is the idea that fair values enhance comparability: Comparability comes not 
from consistent measurement but by representing the business model on a comparable basis.37 See 
Exhibit 2. 
Shareholders invest in firms with a business model in mind, and are the default managers. Most 
often, shareholders manage through agents. So, with respect to the stewardship objective of 
accounting, fair value accounting provides a sufficient measure of performance only when the one-to-
one principle is satisfied. Under other conditions, the shareholder requires a measure of how efficiently 
the manager has transformed inputs into outputs that yield value at market. Historical cost accounting 
(in principle) supplies this information in measures like sales, profit margin, return on net operating 
assets, and earnings growth. Historical cost accounting mirrors how businesses are managed. Managers 
find customers at a price that (hopefully) covers cost. While, as a concept, the value of assets is based 
                                                 
37 This is not to mean that exit values are irrelevant. They may have information about value in alternative use, specifically 
in liquidation (exit) as opposed to value under the going-concern business model. Indeed, the investor needs to compare 
liquidation value with going concern value (to evaluate dispositions and spinoffs), but replacing going-concern, historical 
transactions information with exit values frustrates this comparison. A shareholder of an airline might wish to know the 
market price of a gate at O’Hare, Heathrow, or Frankfurt (for example) as supplementary information, but also requires 
information on the airline’s ability to add value by processing customers through those gates.  
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on the expected success of this endeavor, managers typically do not directly manage the value of 
assets; rather they manage revenues and expenses, with assets and liabilities serving as tools employed 
in the process. Indeed, managers manage assets to lose value – to be used up – in gaining customers 
(and thus become expenses in the income statement).  
 
EXHIBIT 2: Comparing Fair Value Accounting and Historical Transactions  
                       Accounting Under Alternative Business Models 
 
A Business with Separable Assets 
 
Consider a business with two assets, A1 and A2 with market prices M1 and M2. These assets are separable; that 
is, the value of each is independent of whether the firm holds the other such that 
 
 Value of the business = Value of A1 + Value of A2 = M1 + M2 
 
A pure investment fund provides an example; the acquisition or sale of a share holding does not affect the value 
of the shares in the portfolio, and the sum of market values on each holding yields the value of the portfolio.   
 
A Business where Assets are Employed Jointly 
 
Consider a business with two assets, A1 and A2 with market prices M1 and M2 that are used together in the 
business model such that 
 
 Value of the business = Value of (A1 + A2 from joint use) ≠ M1 + M2 
 
The business is combining the two assets together according to an entrepreneurial model with the insight that the 
assets together are worth more than the sum of their market values. Raw materials combined with factories in 
particular locations is an example, as is a brand combined with a distribution system. Most businesses follow 
this model.  
 
In the first case, mark-to-market accounting supplies the value of the business. In the second case, adding 
market values does not yield a summary value for the business. Historical transactions accounting takes a 
different tack. As exit prices on the balance sheet cannot indicate the value of assets in joint use, it reports a 
summary number that relates to the joint use: the earnings flowing from the assets in combination. This is so 
whether the assets can be identified (as in the case of raw materials and factories) but also where assets (such as 
distribution systems or customer relationships) are hard to identify and value. Indeed, earnings also capture the 
value added from the entrepreneurial idea that combines the assets in a unique way to produce value. 
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EXHIBIT 3:  Application of the One-to-One Principle 
The discussion of each of the five principles in this section is complemented with a list of cases where the 
principle strictly applies and where it does not strictly apply. Cases where the principle applies approximately, 
though not strictly, must be entertained in practice, of course. These approximations are discussed is Section IV.  
 
Cases where the One-to-One Principle is satisfied: 
 
(1) Passive investment in securities (in debt investments held as financial assets or in a stock index, for example) 
 
(2) Derivative instruments on such passive investments.  
 
(3) Inventory with no performance: The firm can sell at market price at call, without performance (it does not 
have to find a customer). For example, gold bullion inventories (where the firm does not speculate on the price 
of gold).  
 
(4) Pension assets: The firm has performed by contributing to the fund and has no influence on the performance 
of the fund, but shareholder welfare is affected directly by changes in the market value of the fund.   
 
(5) Passive investment assets for an insurance company.  In the business model these securities are value in 
reserve and the reserve value depends on market price, not performance.  
 
(6) Real estate held as a passive investment (with no involvement in developing or utilizing the real estate). 
 
(7) Options written that give the counter party (but not the firm) the call rights; the firm is a passive party. 
Warrants and options on the firm’s own stock are an example. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mortgages are of 
this type. These are essentially traded put options on real estate – the right of property owners to sell property 
back to these institutions. Shareholders’ welfare is determined by counter party’s call, not the firm’s. The market 
value of the instrument reflects the probability of this call and changes in the market value reflect changes in 
shareholders welfare as this probability changes.  
  
(8) Fair valuing bank assets and liabilities in response to interest rate changes where shareholder value is 
determined solely by exposure to interest rates (and not the customer relationships involved in the intermediary 
function).  
 
Cases where the one-to-one principle is not satisfied: 
 
(1) Active investment securities.  
 
(2) Assets and liabilities whose price changes as interest rates change and there is a numerator effect (effect on 
future earnings) as well as a denominator effect from change in interest rates. These typically are instruments 
that involve a customer relationship.  Examples: mortgages held by originating banks, core deposits, and fixed 
rate consumer loans. Historical transactions accounting allows one to observe the numerator effects.  
 
(3) Inventory where performance is required – the firm has to get a customer. 
 
(4) Investment in a subsidiary where the firm has influence.  
 
(5) Fair valuing performance obligations (instead of deferred revenue recognition) as in the following example: 
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         A customer pays a nonrefundable $100 for future delivery. Fair value accounting books the liability to 
produce and deliver at fair value (what someone else would charge to produce the product). But the 
company can produce the product itself for considerably less.*  
 
(6) Receivable allowances and warranty liabilities. Value to shareholders is based on firm performance in 
servicing these items (through its credit department and customer service department), not what the market 
would charge for non-recourse relief from the obligation. (Note: market values can be justified as a mechanism 
for eliciting better estimates than those made by the firm, but as an exercise for improved historical cost 
accounting, not fair value accounting).  
 
(7) Obligations for loyalty schemes. The value to shareholders of obligations from promises to provide goods 
and services in kind (airline frequent-flier  programs, for example) is not the amount for which awards credit 
could be sold but rather the estimated cost (to the airline) of servicing the awards.  
 
(8) Insurance contracts for a property-casualty insurer. The insurer adds value by choosing whom to insure, 
setting premiums, managing customer relationships, and controlling losses and expense. Historical cost 
accounting informs on the value of this operation.  
 
(9) Real estate held as input to business enterprise (for example, in real estate development and real estate 
rentals). For real estate rentals, historical cost accounting recognizes value through rental income in the income 
statement. Marking the real estate to fair value in the balance sheet involves double counting.  
 
(10) Core deposits for a bank. The value to a given bank is firm specific, based on a model of attracting 
customers, not the value that others might pay to incorporate the deposits into their business model.  
  
(11) Fair value for an environmental clean-up liability: This is the amount that someone would charge for the 
clean up, not the anticipated cost to the firm in managing the problem. 
 
* The FASB is considering this sort of accounting in their revenue recognition project, with a view to an asset-liability 
approach to revenue recognition. Their concern seems to be that historical cost accounting results in deferred debits and 
credits that do not fit their definitions of an asset or liability. But the idea adopts a fair value accounting (asset-liability) 
approach to operationalize an historical cost (income) concept.  
 
 
B. The Matching Principle: Fair value applies to aggregated assets and liabilities 
employed together 
Business enterprise combines assets and liabilities in a particular way to generate value. Indeed, 
business enterprise is a matter of combining productive factors in an innovative way to gain 
competitive advantage. Fair value to shareholders is not the sum of market values of individual assets 
and liabilities but their value in joint use. While individual assets and liabilities may have identifiable, 
stand-alone exit prices, those prices may not represent value to shareholders, individually or in total. 
(See Exhibit 2).  
 Accordingly, fair value accounting applies at the level of portfolios of assets and liabilities that 
are managed as a unit according to a business plan. Fair value accounting, applied to individual assets 
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and liabilities, can give a false impression. Other issues aside, fair value accounting is strictly 
appropriate only for identifiably separable pools of assets and liabilities whose value is determined 
independently of each other. 
Principle 2 (The Matching Principle). Fair value accounting is strictly applicable at a 
level of aggregate net assets that are involved jointly in a given business plan.  
 
The term, “matching principle” is usually applied in historical transactions accounting (to the matching 
of revenues and expenses), but is used here to emphasize that fair value accounting also involves 
matching. Rather than income statement matching, this principle invokes balance-sheet matching: Fair 
values of assets and liabilities, used together in a business plan, must be matched together in the 
balance sheet such that their total reports the fair value in their joint use. Correspondingly, gains and 
losses on those assets and liabilities must be matched in the income statement. Excess volatility in the 
income statement – a standing criticism of fair value accounting – is introduced if this matching is not 
accomplished. This effect is particularly severe when shocks to fair value, such as those due to changes 
in interest rates, have opposite effects on assets and liabilities in a portfolio and matching is violated. 
But excess volatility will also be reported for any portfolio (with mismatching) when correlations of 
component asset prices are positively correlated but not perfectly so. If off-balance sheet arrangements 
are involved in asset-liability management, fair value accounting requires that the contribution of these 
items to the fair value of the portfolio also be considered. 
 Historical transactions accounting also involves significant matching issues, and fair value 
accounting is sometimes promoted as a way to avoid the “myriad of rules” involved in implementing 
revenue and expense matching. However, fair value accounting also presents matching problems. And 
historical transactions accounting has a distinct advantage: It reports the earnings – one summary 
number – from using asset and liabilities jointly. (The ability to segment the income statement into 
income components from different sources provides additional flexibility when earnings come from 
separable assets and liabilities.) It is difficult to see how fair value accounting, in summing exit values 
of individual assets and liabilities, could capture the synergistic value from the business model. This is 
likely only in the case where the one-to-one principle applies, but not necessarily. 
 Principle 2 is well acknowledged in discussions of fair value, as are the implementation 
problems, particularly the identification of the business portfolio level within which the matching is 
effected. The fair value option granted under IAS 39 and FASB Statement 159 aims to help with the 
implementation (though the IASB fair value option appears to focus more directly on implementing the 
matching than that from the FASB). But note that Principle 1 must also be satisfied: The fair value 
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(and corresponding) gains and losses on an instrument whose value fluctuates with market price, one-
to-one, cannot be matched to the fair value of another asset or liability with which it is employed in a 
business model but whose value comes from customer relationships rather than fluctuations in market 
prices. So, marking bank loans to fair value in response to changes in interest rates requires fair 
valuing matched core deposits also, but core deposits, with their imbedded intangibles, are not 
liabilities whose value fluctuates one-to-one with interest rates. The matching principle is satisfied in 
form, but not in substance if assets and liabilities are inappropriately fair valued. Using the fair value 
option merely to  “reduce volatility”  obscures  the  economics and  relegates the fair value option to an  
 
EXHIBIT 4: Application of the Balance Sheet Matching Principle 
 
Cases where the Matching Principle is satisfied: 
 
(1) Derivatives and the underlying marked to market under Principle 1. 
 
(2) Fair valuing all assets and liabilities in a portfolio of securities formed under a given diversification strategy. 
 
(3) Fair valuing gold inventories and instruments held as a hedge against the price of gold. 
 
(4) Fair valuing both options that give the counter party the call rights (under Principle 1) and instruments 
designed to protect against changes in those option prices.  
 
(5) Fair valuing debt in response to changes in interest rates and matching the consequent unrealized gains and 
losses to those from debt investments (excess cash) held as (in substance) defeasance for the debt. 
 
Cases where the Matching Principle is not satisfied: 
 
(1) Core deposits. These liabilities represent the ability to obtain relatively inexpensive funds from demand, 
savings and small-denomination time deposits; they imbed an intangible asset. The value of these customer 
intangibles are difficult to estimate. However, their value is negatively related to the value of the loan portfolio: 
When interest rates rise, the value of the loan portfolio typically declines, but the value of the core-deposit 
intangible asset typically also changes (but not one-to-one). If the loan portfolio is marked-to-market but the 
value of the core deposits intangible is not recognized (in order to honor Principle 1, for example), earnings and 
book value will be inappropriately reported. 
 
(2) Borrowings. The decline in the value of a firm’s assets (due to deteriorating profitability) is accompanied by 
an offsetting decline in the value of its debt obligations (due to deteriorating credit quality).  If the decrease in 
the value of liabilities is recognized as a gain in the income statement, but the decrease in asset value is not 
recognized (for example, due to difficulties in measuring the value of some intangible assets such as customer 
relationships), earnings will be overstated at times when high quality information is especially important.*  With 
a clear distinction between operating and financing activities in the income statement, marking financing debt to 
market may be more appropriate under historical cost accounting (for operating activities). See the discussion in 
the text. 
 
(3) Fair valuing individual banking products sold as a package: credit card receivables, demand deposits, 
investment services, insurance products.  
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(4) Recognizing changes in fair values of financial assets and liabilities on the balance sheet during a credit 
squeeze but not recognizing the increase in the fair value of obligations connected to off-balance sheet vehicles. 
 
(5)  Recognizing a decline in the value of servicing rights (for a bank) when interest rates decline, but not 
recognizing that the volume of securitizations and hence securitizations gains typically also increase.  
 
(6) Allocation of fair value to individual assets and liabilities in an acquisition. Individual assets and liabilities 
do not have stand-alone fair value. The allocation is justified only for the purpose of identifying cost pools that 
might have different depreciation rates under historical cost accounting.  
 
*Barth, Hodder and Stubben, in a 2006 paper, show that, for firms with more debt, equity returns are less negative when 
credit risk increases, indicating that the effect of declining credit quality on equity is mitigated by debt. But they also show 
that recording gains on a deterioration of credit quality will overstate income without the recognition of decreases in 
(intangible) asset values, although the effects are typically small. See M. Barth, L. Hodder, and S. Stubben, “Fair Value 
Accounting for Liabilities and Own Credit Risk,” unpublished paper, Stanford University, 2006.  
 
 
earnings management tool.  
The question of marking financing debt to market on a deterioration of credit quality (discussed 
in Exhibit 4) requires further comment. Unless fair value accounting is applied to assets whose value 
declines as the fair value of debt increases (probably with Level 3 estimates), the fair value matching 
principle is violated. As the matched assets are likely to be intangibles, their fair valuing is a doubtful 
exercise (see Principle 1 and Principle 4 to come). This raises the specter that fair valuing debt may be 
more applicable under historical transactions accounting: If the decline in the value of assets is 
accounted for by reporting the reduced income that results – reporting losses for example – then the 
gain on the debt can be recognized and matched against that income in the income statement.38 (There 
should be a clear demarcation between income from operating and financing activities, however). This, 
again, invokes the principle that, under historical transactions accounting, the value of assets is 
imputed from the earnings they produce. Further, if debt assets (marketable debt securities) are marked 
to market, marking financing debt to market as well invokes a matching that yields net debt at fair 
value. So, if the value of marketable securities (that store excess cash) falls because of an increase in 
interest rates, the resultant loss is offset in the income statement by a gain on the financing debt. 
                                                 
38 Evidence shows that bond prices change when historical cost losses are reported. See P. Easton, S. Monahan, and F. 
Vasvari, “Initial Evidence on the Role of Accounting Earnings in the Bond Market,” unpublished paper, Notre Dame 
University, 2007. Default prediction and credit scoring models typically include an earnings variable that increases the 
default probability as earnings decline. Historical cost accounting, as practiced, requires timely loss recognition through 
write downs and impairments, so deterioration in profitability gets into earnings relatively quickly when default 
probabilities increase substantially. 
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Further, if the debt is coupled with interest rate hedges that are fair valued, the fair value of the 
underlying is also matched if debt is fair valued.39 
 
C. The Information Conservation Principle: When accounting informs about price, 
price cannot inform the accounting 
Fair value accounting is often advocated with the argument that prices are typically more informative 
than historical cost numbers; prices aggregate a wider set of information than historical costs. Prices (it 
is said) also provide more timely information than historical costs (which are market prices only when 
an asset is acquired). The argument is well taken, for price-to-book ratios are typically different from 
one and price/earnings ratios typically indicate that the stock market has information about future 
earnings that is not conveyed by reported earnings.  
These arguments miss a crucial point, however. There is a tension between reporting 
information in market prices and supplying information for determining market prices. Consider two 
cases, one where price equals fair value to shareholders and one where it does not. 
Case 1: Price equals fair value to shareholders (efficient prices) 
In this case, the one-to-one principle holds, so the issues raised here are in addition to those already 
discussed.  
Consider (F) an asset with historical cost book value of $100 million that generates 
historical cost earnings of $12 million from sales in the current year. The asset is 
forecasted to produce earnings, in perpetuity, of $12 million per year. Standard 
valuation theory tells us that, if investors’ required return is 10% per year, the asset is 
worth $120 million (the earnings capitalized as the required rate of return). Indeed, this 
is the valuation based on ideal historical transactions accounting in valuation (D) in 
Section II (and the valuation applied to The Coca Cola Company in Appendix B, with 
an additional growth feature). In this benchmark case, current earnings inform perfectly 
about future earnings, and fair value is simply the earnings multiplied by a multiple 
given by the inverse of the required return: Fair value = $12 million × 10 = $120 
million. The market prices this asset (efficiently) at $120 million (equal to fair value to 
shareholders).  
 
If mark-to-market accounting were applied in this example, the asset would be booked at $120 million, 
surely more informative of value than the $100 million historical cost. But without the information 
                                                 
39 Of course, one can also record a deferred gain or loss from the change in the fair value of the hedge, to be matched later  
 
against a realized change in fair value of the underlying debt.  
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about the profitability of the asset from an historical cost income statement, one cannot infer the fair 
value. The point is demonstrated: 
Principle 3 (The Information Conservation Principle). Fair value accounting supplies 
an alternative to historical cost accounting only when prices are not based on historical 
cost information. 
 
Fair value accounting and historical transactions accounting are mutually exclusive within one 
accounting system. Fair value accounting results in an income statement that is uninformative for 
valuation (as Section II explained). Historical transactions accounting provides an informative income 
statement about profitability of investments that informs about their value (as also explained in Section 
II). Adoption of fair value accounting destroys the historical cost information. If historical cost 
information is necessary to determine fair value, fair value accounting loses information and market 
prices become less informative rather than more informative. The recycling of these less-informative 
prices back into the financial statements creates a spiral of poor accounting and inefficient prices.  
Accounting would become a matter of appraisal, but appraisers would then have to become 
accountants and regenerate the profitability information to get back to value. Replacing information 
about prices with prices is a reductio ad absurdum.40 
Case 2: Price does not equal fair value to shareholders (inefficient prices) 
The prospect of inefficient prices raises the issue of applying fair value accounting in inefficient 
markets where prices deviate from fundamental value. The bubble markets in the late 1990s and the 
seemingly depressed debt prices in the higher tranches in the recent sub-prime credit squeeze give the 
issue currency. Research in behavioral finance has produced reservations about the “efficient market 
hypothesis.”41 
If fair value accounting brings bubble prices into the financial statements, (historical cost) 
information that would otherwise be useful in challenging and correcting the bubble price is corrupted. 
Indeed, with prices based on accounting information that reflects prices, inferences would be circular 
and accounting would become a vehicle for perpetuating the bubble, an instrument in a pyramid 
scheme. If debt were further downgraded in response to reported losses from depressed debt prices in a 
credit squeeze, some fear a self-perpetuating cascade effect could follow. 
Accounting best serves as a reference to fundamentals, independent of price.   Efficient markets 
                                                 
40 Research that evaluates fair value accounting using stock prices that are conditional upon the prevailing historical cost 
information suffers from the same complaint.  
41 See, for example, A. Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (Oxford University Press, 
2000) and D. Hirshleifer, “Investor Psychology and Asset pricing, Journal of Finance 56 (2001), 1533–1597. 
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EXHIBIT 5: Application of the Information Conservation Principle 
 
Cases where the information conservation principle is violated: 
 
(1) Carrying investments in a subsidiary at fair value rather than using the equity method (or proportional 
consolidation) that conveys information about the profitability (and value) of the subsidiary. 
 
(2) Long-dated contracts. A long-term energy contract on the output of a plant or a contract on future patent 
streams. One cannot get period resolution on the value of this contract without periodic historical cost 
information about how profitable the underlying has been. 
 
(3) Fair valuing a financial intermediary function – a business that adds value from the spread between 
borrowing and lending rates – by fair valuing loans and borrowings. The value of the net assets is assessed from 
the historical cost accounting on how well the firm arbitrages borrowing and lending rates.  
 
(4) Fair valuing insurance activities: One needs information on how well the firm prices and manages risks, that 
is, the spread between premium revenues and losses (premium/loss ratios).  
 
(5) Gains on pension assets that flow through to a firm’s income statement when the pension fund holds the 
firm’s own shares (or shares correlated with the price of the firm’s own shares). Earnings then reflect changes in  
the price of the firm’s own shares and thus lose their ability to inform about the price of the firm’s shares. 
(Reporting pension gains and losses separately from normal business earnings deals with this issue, but this is 
not done under pension accounting in FASB Statement 87). 
 
 
require accounting information that forces prices towards the fundamental. The transactions analysis of 
historical cost accounting – that reports value added from customer and firm behavior – supplies this 
(in part); fair value accounting – that reports on price behavior – can promote inefficient pricing.  
 It is not reasonable to expect accountants, in the application on fair value accounting, to 
determine  whether  the  prices  they  are  booking  to  balance sheets  are  efficient  or  not.   Rather the 
 
EXHIBIT 6. The Bubble Problem 
Cases where marking to bubble prices is a concern: 
 
(1) Pension accounting during a bubble: Firms appear overfunded in their balance sheets, and bubble gains on 
pension assets flow into income. 
 
(2) Mark-to-market gains on available-for-sale technology portfolios held during the recent bubble (by Intel, 
Cisco, Microsoft, for example).  
 
(3) Investments of insurance companies market to market: In a bubble, reserves against future losses are 
overstated. 
 
(4) Mark-to-market of debt assets and collateralized debt obligations when liquidity dries up and the few market 
prices available are depressed, fire-sale prices. 
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accountant’s focus should be on producing accounting information that is independent of prices. That 
information about the real activity within the firm then informs prices. 
 
D. The No-arbitrage Estimation Principle: “Fair” value estimates obey no-arbitrage 
principles with respect to observed prices  
Principles 1 - 3 have been discussed with Level 1 fair values in mind in, to separate issues pertaining to 
the application of exit-price fair values from those involved with their estimation. Level 2 and 3 
measurements in FASB Statement 157, Fair Value Measurements, admit estimates of hypothetical 
market prices when prices are not available from liquid markets. With echoes of the Enron episode, the 
shareholder is concerned:42 
 
Consider (D1) a firm that builds an energy plant and signs long-term contracts for the supply of 
energy. Its accountants deem the firm to be selling contracts rather than energy, with fair values 
applied to the contracts. No market exists for these contracts so they are valued on the basis of 
expected future energy prices, booking Day 1 profit.  
 
Consider (D2) a firm builds an energy plant and signs long-term contracts for the 
supply of energy. The firm constructs a trading floor where contracts are bought and 
sold, but with very thin trading. The firm is often involved in these trades and supplies a 
significant percentage of monthly trading volume. Traders use valuation models based 
on forward price curves that can be mismarked and incorporate estimated prudency 
reserves in their valuations. 
 
The objections to using subjective estimates are well understood. However, all accounting beyond 
mere cash accounting involves estimates. The question of where to draw the line on estimates (Level 2 
but not Level 3?) is difficult to handle a priori, so we merely make a number of pertinent points to 
consider here. Resolution of the issue rides largely on one’s assessment, not only of the integrity of 
managers but also of their (honest) subjective biases. The competence and independence of monitors – 
auditors, assessors, valuation committees, and corporate boards – must also be evaluated, along with 
                                                 
42 For more on fair value accounting at Enron, see, for example, G. Benston, “Fair-Value Accounting: A Cautionary Tale 
from Enron,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (2006), 465-484,  
available at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejappol/v_3A25_3Ay_3A2006_3Ai_3A4_3Ap_3A465-484.htm. Also see 
R. Haldeman, Jr., “Fact, Fiction, and Fair Value Accounting at Enron,” The CPA Journal (November 2006), 15-21. 
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the effectiveness of controls.43 (Honest) managers are naturally optimistic, for it is their business plan.  
Some argue that estimates elicit information from management that may not otherwise surface. Moral 
hazard problems in a stewardship setting are well appreciated, however, and experience with estimates 
in accounting is not particularly comforting. Rewarding managers on their own estimates is a doubtful 
exercise, particularly if management follow-through is necessary to find customers and collect cash. 
Historically, accounting has required a high hurdle for measurement: It is not done unless one 
has a sound objective basis. Accounting then serves as a counterweight to managements’ optimism as 
well as an instrument to deal with moral hazard; raising managements’ valuations to the level of 
accounting information contaminates. The requirement (in Statement 157) that fair values must be by 
reference to a current market prices is in the tradition of objective measurement. It has the effect of 
excluding estimates of value-to-shareholder and that differ from market prices – with the effect that 
only assets and liabilities satisfying the one-to-one condition should be fair valued – but with Level 1 
prices it does maintain objectivity.  
 However, Levels 2 and 3 admit estimated market prices and that raises concerns. Level 3 in 
particular appears to be permissive rather than restrictive: It admits “unobservable inputs” that “reflect 
the reporting entity’s own assumptions about assumptions that market participants would use in pricing 
the asset or liability.”  Those assumptions are to be based on “best available information” but “the 
reporting entity need not undertake all possible efforts to obtain information.” The appeal to valuation 
techniques “to convert future amounts to a single present amount” is seductive but dubious. Valuation 
models have the appearance of precision (many are mathematical formulas) and are often wrapped in 
academic respectability, but they require subjective inputs. Indeed, valuation techniques such as 
discounted cash flow analysis are notorious for abuse; they can be used to justify a wide range of 
valuations. A model where an input is estimated revenue is particularly dangerous, for it is revenue 
without a validating transaction. The requirement that a Level 3 price should approximate the prices 
that “market participants would use” (rather than the firm’s own internal estimate) is constraining, yet 
it has the effect if estimating prices at which the firm would not trade (for example, prices in a 
distressed market from fire-sale trades).  
 One might take an extreme position and not permit any marking-to-model. But a useful 
distinction can be made between models that price form observed related prices, as a matter of 
                                                 
43 See R. Martin, J. Rich, and T. Wilks, “Auditing Fair Value Measurements: A Synthesis of Relevant Research,” 
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financial engineering under no-arbitrage assumptions, and those that involve the anticipation of future 
streams. Derivative pricing formulas fall into the former category, discounted cash flow analyses into 
the latter. The distinction between Level 2 from Level 3 is thus a pertinent one, for Level 2 imputes 
prices from quoted prices of similar assets or liabilities, adjusted as appropriate for differences. 
 These considerations lead to the following principle for disciplining estimated fair values when 
prices for assets or liabilities cannot be observed in liquid markets: 
Principle 4 (The No-arbitrage Estimation Principle). Estimates of hypothetical prices 
that might pertain in a given market should be recognized in accounting only when 
those estimates are imputed from observed prices and inputs in active comparison 
markets, with no arbitrage available between the two markets nor implied in the 
estimate.  
 
This principle protects against adding value simply as a matter of estimate.  It constrains the estimate 
in three ways. First, it retains the principle that an estimate must be made with reference to an observed 
price (or inputs, like interest rates) observed in contemporaneous comparison markets; estimates from 
illiquid comparison markets and those based on subjective assessment of expected prices in future 
(spot) markets are excluded.  Second, the firm cannot, as a matter of business, arbitrage the two 
markets by buying in one and selling in the other; using a London price to estimate a New York price 
is excluded if the firm can add value by buying in London and selling in New York. Third, the 
valuation technique must deliver a valuation that adds no value to the observed comparison price; the 
valuation method is based on a no-arbitrage pricing formula.44  
The last point is particularly important: The model cannot be a model of business arbitrage. A 
discounted cash flow valuation fails this criterion as it involves business activity, specific to the entity, 
that arbitrages current prices and future exit prices in product markets — so-called expectational 
arbitrage of prices at different dates (that contrasts to cross-sectional arbitrage of two prices at the same 
point in time).  A derivative pricing formula, in contrast, involves contemporaneous prices (in the 
derivatives market and the market for the underlying), with no arbitrage involved.45 Matrix pricing 
would seem to be consistent with Principle 4. 
                                                 
44 Principle 4 is general, for it clearly covers the Level 1 case where the price is observed directly rather than in a 
comparison market.  
 
45 Derivative pricing formulas often require estimates, so do not remove the estimation problem entirely.  For example, 
Black-Scholes option pricing formulas require estimates of stock price volatility (and other inputs) and evidence suggest 
that these estimates are selectively made in pricing employees stock options for financial reporting.  See D. Aboody, M. 
Barth, and R. Kasznik, “Do Firms Understate Stock Option-based Compensation Expense Disclosed under SFAS 123?” 
Review of Accounting Studies 11:4 (December 2006); E. Bartov, P. Mohanram, and D. Nissim, “Managerial Discretion and 
the Economic Determinants of the Disclosed volatility Parameter for Valuing ESOs” Review of Accounting Studies 12 
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 Principle 4 admits, but restricts, the use of “direct market inputs” like interest rates that are 
admitted in the FASB proposal: The no-arbitrage principle must apply in this case also. One might 
revalue a loan portfolio for a bank upon a change in interest rates (using standard yield-to-maturity, no-
arbitrage valuation models), but the lending activity involves customer and depositor relationships that 
arbitrage interest rates. One errs if the demand for loans is affected by interest rates or credit spreads 
that are correlated with interest rates. On the other hand, the value of interest rate swaps (that have no 
market value) can be estimated easily with a no-arbitrage model. 
The restriction in Principle 1 that fair value accounting applies only when shareholder value is 
solely determined by exposure to market prices means that, in most cases, there will be an active 
market where Level 1 measurements are available (interest rate swaps aside). If a firm has to execute 
by finding a customer or counterparty in an illiquid market, value is usually determined by that ability 
to execute, not solely by market prices. So situations where estimation is required may be limited (if 
the one-to-one condition is honored).  
 Note two further points regarding estimated fair values: 
First, fair value estimation errors introduce error into the balance sheet but also the income 
statement (which reports the change in fair value). Indeed, with random errors in both the opening and 
closing balance sheet – bias aside – the errors are compounded in the income statement, because the 
income involves errors in both the beginning and ending balance sheet.46 Bias in estimates is, of 
course, a concern and the issue that typically attracts the most criticism. Random error is assumed to be 
of lesser importance, for it cancels, on average, over time. However, systematic bias cancels in 
earnings if there is no growth, but random error (and changes in the size and direction of bias) 
magnifies volatility on the income statement. Fuzzy fair values not only yield a less informative 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(March 2007); S. Balsam, H. Mozes, and H. Newman, “Managing Pro Forma Stock Option Expense under SFAS No. 123,” 
Accounting Horizons 17 (March 2003), 31-45; and D, Yermack, “Companies Modest Claims about the Value of CEO Stock 
Option Awards,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 10 (1998), 207-226. 
 
 
46 This effect is demonstrated formally in K. Peasnell, “Institution-specific Value,” BIS Working Paper No. 210, August 
2006. As an example, consider a firm that owns a bond purchased several years ago for $10. Subsequent to the purchase, 
interest rates declined, raising the fair (and book) value of the bond to $14 as of the beginning of the current year. During 
the current year, interest rates increased such that the fair value of the bond is $12 at the end of the year. However, the firm 
reports a fair value of $13 (a $1 measurement error). The measurement error in the balance sheet is 8.3% (1/13) of the 
reported fair value or 33.3% of the accumulated mark up from cost (1/(13-10)). The measurement error in the income 
statement is 100% of the reported unrealized loss (=1/(13-14)). The difference in the relative magnitude of measurement 
errors in the income statement and balance sheet is even larger when the sign of the balance sheet error changes during the 
year (for example, negative at the beginning of the year and positive at the end of the year). M. Barth, “Fair Value 
Accounting: Evidence from Investment Securities and the Market Valuation of Banks,” The Accounting Review 69 (January 
1994), 1-25 provides evidence of this differential measurement error. 
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balance sheet but also introduce a fuzzy and less informative income statement. This is in contrast to 
historical transactions accounting where the income statement (in principle) redeems an uninformative 
balance sheet. Implementing fair value accounting with error as an alternative to reporting historical 
transactions accounting, may thus lose information.  
 Second, historical cost accounting (in practice) also contains estimates, of course, and Principle 
4 also applies to those estimates when they are made with reference to prices in related markets. It is 
sometimes said that historical cost estimates and fair value estimates are no different.47 But estimates 
to effect matching under historical cost are based on, and audited against, the historical transaction 
record – like the historical experience with credit losses, useful lives and warranty service costs. Level 
2, with “observable inputs” could be interpreted as invoking this notion. But the notion is quite 
different from speculating about the present value of the cash flows when marking to model. No-
arbitrage valuation models, admitted under Principle 4, often require estimates (of volatilities, for 
example), but observed historical volatilities discipline the estimates.  
 
EXHIBIT 7. Application of the No-arbitrage Estimation Principle 
Cases where Principle 4 is satisfied: 
 
(1) Derivative pricing models based on no arbitrage. 
 
Cases where Principle 4 is not satisfied: 
 
(1) Estimates from illiquid comparison markets (where a liquidity premium might be imputed). 
 
(2) Estimates where a firm’s activities affect market prices (for energy trades, for example). 
 
(3) Estimates based on future prices where the firm’s business is arbitraging current and future prices. A typical 
business involving purchase if inputs currently with the expectation of selling a product in the future involves 
arbitraging current and future prices.  
 
(4) Discounted cash flow models applied to assets and liabilities involved in the business of adding value.  
 
(5) Estimates using market inputs applied to assets and liabilities with customer relationships attached such as 
core deposits and loan portfolios. 
 
(6) Estimates made from depressed prices in comparison markets that are a buying opportunity for the firm. For 
example, referring to prices in higher tranches of debt in a credit squeeze (for which there are some distressed 
prices available) to value lower tranches for which there is no traded price. 
 
 
                                                 
47 Fair value estimates and historical cast estimates are compared in M. Barth, “Including Estimates of the Future in 
Today’s Financial Statements,” Accounting Horizons 20 (September 2006), 271-285. 
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E. The Truing-up Principle: To be “fair,” accounting for fair values trues up against 
actual transactions 
While Principle 4 restricts the admission of estimates, residual concerns remain. Random estimation 
error produces balance sheets and income statements that are on average correct, although income 
statements that do report too much volatility. Systematic bias in estimates, however, introduces 
persistent error in both the balance sheet and (with growth) in the income statement. The following 
principle addresses the issue:  
Principle 5 (The Truing-up Principle). Fair value accounting is appropriate only with 
additional reporting on the settling up of the accounting against transactions at market 
prices, providing the validation that fair value estimates are, on average, fair.  
 
If estimated fair values are unbiased, average unrealized gains and losses (from marking to fair value) 
equal average realized gains and losses; that is, estimated value equals value realized on average. Thus, 
is addition to Day 1 profits, the specter of Last Day losses (or gains) recognized on the truing up 
emerges with misapplied fair value accounting. Appropriate accounting reports on the truing up. In 
most cases, the truing-up is forced by a reconciliation to a cash transaction (but see Exhibit 8 for an 
exception); if the final settling up against cash consistently books a loss, concerns are raised. Truing up 
is of a particular concern with long-term contracts carried at fair value where the settling up is in the 
long-term but, from balance sheet date to balance sheet date, fair value estimates (at the beginning of a 
period) settle up against fair value estimates (at the end of the period) rather than against transactions. 
The truing-up presumably enforces discipline on estimates, although that will depend on the 
horizon of the agents making the estimates: systematic bias, being an on-average phenomenon affected 
by ex post noise, is revealed only slowly through this mechanism.48 Truing-up also comes into play 
when fair values are marked to market (not estimated) but those market prices are bubble or distress 
prices that are not a good indication of prices to be realized on settlement. 
 
F. Tying the Principles Together 
All five principles are necessary for a strict application of fair value accounting to shareholders. 
However, their ordering is important. Principle 1, the one-to-one principle, is of highest order for, if it 
is violated, the other principles are moot.  However,  Principle 1  is not sufficient;  the  other principles 
                                                 
48 One might also encourage the reporting the settling-up of estimates under historical cost accounting (in supplementary 
disclosures), such as the reconciliation of actual claims to estimated claims now reported in the footnotes of insurance 
companies and the tracking of actual restructuring charges against a restructuring reserve. 
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EXHIBIT 8: Application of the Truing-up Principle 
Cases where Principle 5 is satisfied: 
 
(1) Truing up unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities against realized outcomes. 
 
Cases where Principle 5 is not satisfied: 
 
(1) Stock option accounting under FASB Statement No.123R and IFRS Statement No. 2 requires recognition of 
an expense at grant date, measured at the fair value of the options granted, but does not true up on the exercise 
of the option. Thus, if the option is not subsequently exercised, the recorded expense is not reversed. If the 
option is exercised, the additional value lost to shareholders is not recognized. If the value of options at grant 
date is underestimated (or options are backdated), the cost to the shareholder is never reported. In short, the 
accounting in these two statements fails to settle-up against fair value realizations.* 
 
(2) A warranty liability estimated with quotes from outside servicers but actually serviced more efficiently by 
the firm’s own service department. As the firm can provide the warranty service for less, it records a warranty 
gain on settlement of the liability.  
 
(3) An environmental liability booked on outside estimates for clean-up costs (exit market price), results in a 
predictable Last Day profit if the firm can clean up for less.  
 
* CEASA’s White Paper No. 1 deals with this issue (among others). See Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security 
Analysis, White Paper No. 1, “Debt vs. Equity: Accounting for Claims Contingent on Firms' Common Stock Performance, 
with Particular Attention to Employee Compensation Options” (authors J. Ohlson and S. Penman) at 
https://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/ceasa/research/progress/debtequity. Also see J. Ohlson and S. Penman, “Accounting for 
Employee Stock Options and Other Contingent Equity Claims: Taking a Shareholders’ View,” Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, Spring 2007. 
 
 
must be upheld and, in turn, the application of any one of the principles depends on the ability to honor 
other principles in the set.  
 If Principle 1 applies, then matching under Principle 2 comes into play. But Principle 1 must 
be honored in the matching: Matching to an asset or liability that does not imbed the one-to-one 
principle violates the economics behind Principle 1 (as in the core deposit example in Exhibit 3). 
Further, Principle 4 must also be satisfied if the matching is to an estimated asset or liability: If 
estimation involves the violation of the no-arbitrage estimation principle, the matching is ineffective 
(as with the fair valuing of bank loans in the example in Exhibit 4 where estimates of intangible assets 
associated with core deposits are required). 
 Principles 4 and 5, governing estimates of fair values, also apply only when Principle 1 is first 
satisfied. One suspects that, in cases where shareholders value is determined by exposure to market 
prices (and so Principle 1 holds), active markets for the asset or liability are functioning or, if not, 
observable prices are available from related markets, with financial engineering models available to 
facilitate a no-arbitrage estimate from one market to the other.  
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 Principle 3, the information conservation principle, is also applicable only when Principle 1 is 
satisfied, but Principle 1 also requires Principle 3 to hold. This is the case for equity subsidiary 
investments (in Exhibit 5): Although shareholder value is tied, one-to-one, to the price of the 
subsidiary (if prices are efficient), those prices cannot replace historical cost information in the 
accounts if they are based on the historical cost information. Principle 3 also says that the admission of 
bubble prices under fair value accounting makes Principle 1 inoperable.  
 The principles, taken together, are quite restrictive. Historical cost accounting is the default.49 
Principle 3 reinforces this: Fair value accounting cannot displace historical cost accounting on which 
fair values are based. 
 
G. A Unifying Principle: the Economics of Arbitrage 
This paper is written under the presumption that accounting is to be judged on how transparently it 
reveals the economics of the business in adding value for shareholders. Businesses are typically 
formed under an entrepreneurial idea about how to arbitrage market prices.  That is, entrepreneurs 
transact in markets by acquiring assets and other factors of production and then, under an 
organizational design that combines these factors, produce added value in the form of products or 
services that they then take back to market to sell to customers.  Businesses arbitrage input and output 
prices. The issue, then, is what form of accounting best reports the ability of firms to arbitrage markets.  
If prices were available that indicated the value of each asset in every productive use – a 
complete market – those prices would of course be the reference point. So, if there were a market price 
for the a pile of coal sitting in a port in Western Australia to be shipped to China to be combined with 
other materials and labor to produce steel, that price would represent the value of the coal in the 
Chinese steel producer’s books. The complete set of prices does not exist, of course, primarily because 
businesses apply unique business processes that differentiate them from the competition.  Without 
those price references, fair value accounting suffers as an instrument for reporting how businesses add 
value by arbitraging prices (of coal in Western Australia and finished steel in China).  
Accordingly, one economic principle overarches all five principles for determining when fair 
value accounting is appropriate: no-arbitrage. “No-arbitrage” means that one cannot add value to a 
given price: “fair” prices are those that cannot be arbitraged by creating instruments or conducting 
                                                 
49 Other measurement bases such as replacement cost or deprival value might also be considered, of course, but are not on 
the table here.  
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business affairs in such a way as to produce same-date value that differs from this price. Principle 1 
invokes this notion by requiring that fair value accounting (using exit values) applies only when a firm 
cannot arbitrage the current (exit) price with its business model. A firm, in the business of arbitrage, 
sells an asset (at exit price) only when its value is deemed to be equal to, or more, than its value in the 
business model, and retains the asset when the exit price is deemed to be less than its value. Principle 4 
insists that estimates obey the no-arbitrage principle with respect to observed prices. Principle 5 says 
that an estimate fails the no-arbitrage test if one can forecast Last Day losses (or profits); that is, a 
present value that includes the anticipated Last Day losses (or profits) differs from the estimate. 
Principle 2 says that, with matching appropriately executed, one cannot determine an alternative fair 
value to that in the balance sheet by understanding arbitrage: Reporting fair value as the sum of the fair 
values of individual assets ignores the arbitrage value that a business model can generate by employing 
the assets jointly. Mismatching, like biased estimates, creates anticipated gains or losses not recognized 
in the recorded fair value, but no-arbitrage valuations have no anticipated gains or losses beyond the 
expected return for risk borne. And Principle 3 says that fair value accounting is not appropriate if one 
cannot arbitrage an exit value by determining an alternative fair value with an equity analysis that 
employs historical transactions accounting.  
Simply, appropriate fair values (for shareholders) are no-arbitrage values. As businesses are 
typically in the business or arbitraging prices, fair value accounting, based on observed (or 
hypothetical) market prices, would seem to have limited applicability. Businesses are in the business of 
adding value to market prices and accounting is a system of adding (accounting) value to the book 
value of equity. The accounting might be done, in principle, by marking balance sheets items to market 
value, but using prices that are being arbitraged to do so does not work.50 
                                                 
50 The perspective is similar to that under Coase’s transactions cost theory of the firm. Firms exist because markets are not 
perfect and thus prices do not measure value under all conditions. Firms and their hierarchies are more efficient than 
markets in some respect, entrepreneurs discover those inefficiencies, and historical cost accounting reports the efficiency of 
firms is dealing in imperfect prices. See R. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin Publishers, 1937). 
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IV. Practical Considerations in Applying Fair Value Accounting 
 
The five principles define a benchmark, “best case” fair value accounting. However, in the spirit of 
“principles-based” accounting, they are principles to guide the adoption of fair value accounting rather 
than rules demanding precision. Practical considerations may require approximations.  
 
Approximate Fair Value Accounting 
Approximate conditions can be identified against the benchmark provided by the principles, with the 
principles then serving to understand the effect of the approximations, the degree to which the 
approximation introduces an “accounting quality” problem. So, for example, matching under Principle 
2 might be done using estimated Level 3 fair values for the matched assets and liabilities even though 
Principle 4 governing such estimates is strictly violated. In this case, the matching principle is 
satisfied, but only approximately, and Principle 4 then serves as a pointer to where an accounting 
quality problem might exist.  
 A case where an approximation might be entertained (for example) – and where the 
approximation might be an improvement over historical cost accounting – is that of the active trader in 
Case C1b. Here the trader can readily sell his holding at the market price, but deems market price to be 
below fair value. Strictly, the one-to-one principle is not satisfied: Active trading (the business 
enterprise) involves the timing of both purchases and sales of securities and the timing of the sale has 
yet to be executed. Yet, marking the asset to market would provide information about the likely 
resolution of the trading position, more so than historical cost accounting. Most people would agree 
that, for a bond (or share) trader, fair value accounting is appropriate (provided the other principles are 
honored, approximately).51  
 Approximate fair value accounting might also be used when historical cost accounting has 
dysfunctional feedback effects. The cherry picking of realized gains on investment securities into 
income (while avoiding realized losses) is a behavioral response to historical cost accounting that is 
seemingly dysfunctional. (The issue only arises for investment securities that do not come under the 
scope of fair value accounting under the five principles.) Fair value accounting supplies a remedy, 
even though the one-to-one principle is strictly violated for an active trader. The matching Principle 2 
                                                 
51 Marking to market in this case can be seen as a variant on the “percentage-of-completion” method for long-term 
contracting (without the estimation problems). Percentage-of-completion strictly violates standard revenue recognition 
principles in the interest of updating progress on a business plan, and changes in the market price of a security can be seen 
as progress towards completion of the business enterprise of active trading.  
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would have to be honored, however: The matched gains and losses are recognized within a portfolio 
where the concern is about the performance of the portfolio as a whole. (GAAP currently reports 
unrealized gains and losses in equity rather than the income statement.) 
 While the five principles provide an understanding of what is compromised in adopting 
approximate fair value accounting, it is difficult to specify a priori what is a reasonable approximation. 
The C1b case of the bond trader is usually seen as a reasonable approximation. However that case also 
applies to a bank holding distressed debt (in the recent sub-prime credit squeeze, for example) where it 
might be argued (and was argued) that the market price is not an unbiased indication of value to be 
received on realization. Classifications such as “held to maturity” might serve a useful purpose in 
delineating (in principle) when the one-to-one principle holds under the business model. 
If the approximation is tolerated in objection to existing historical cost accounting, the prospect 
of improving historical cost accounting must also be considered. Section V throws light on the issue.   
 
Supplementary Disclosure 
As fair value accounting and historical cost accounting have to be forced through the same system of 
articulating income statements and balance sheets, they are mutually exclusive. Inevitably, choosing 
one will exclude information that otherwise would have been conveyed by the alternative. The five 
principles, invoked in the spirit of conveying information about value to shareholders, are thus 
exclusionary. Entity inputs about fair value (management forecasts) are shunned, for example. Such 
exclusions define supplementary disclosure (in footnotes or the Management Discussion and 
Analysis); the principles implicitly say that forecasts belong in the MD&A or a press release, not the 
accounts.  
 One issue that is particularly relevant to the application of fair value accounting is that of fair 
valuing bank assets and liabilities in response to changes in interest rates. Investors presumably wish to 
understand the sensitivity of a bank’s asset-liability position to interest rate changes, and historical cost 
accounting during the U.S. savings and loan crisis is often pointed to as being deficient in this respect 
(though one must not confuse the objections of regulators and politicians, vocal in retrospect, with 
those of shareholders). Value to bank shareholders comes from the business model involving 
relationships with depositors and borrowers, and from managing the through-put between them, along 
with associated transactions business. The business involves intangibles that cannot be valued under 
the estimation constraints of Principle 4.  Managing the yield curve is involved, but exposure to 
interest rates is just one element, lacking a one-to-one relationship to shareholder value.  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Center for Excellence in Accounting & Security Analysis 46 
 Exposure to a change in interest rates is a market exposure, and it might be possible to design 
an accounting system where effects of shifts in the yield curve are separated from other gains and 
losses from business, though one presumes that interest rates are correlated with credit spreads and 
have a secondary effect on the supply of deposits and demand for loans. But in any case, a realization 
for one period is not particularly informative.  In contrast, a complete scenario analysis can be 
displayed in footnotes. Indeed, even in cases where fair value accounting is used (in hedge funds), the 
accounting is supplemented with other risk metrics (like Sharpe ratios, betas, and Value-at-Risk) that 
relate to a broader set of realizations (including the extreme outcomes in the tails) that rarely show up 
in the accounts. The accounting system is not a good vehicle for reporting on ex ante risk, particularly 
the exposure to the relevantly infrequent events with large consequences. It is the prospect of these 
events with which investors are (presumably) most concerned. 
 
Applying Fair Values under Historical Cost Accounting 
The five principles pertain to the use of fair value accounting as an alternative to historical cost 
accounting. That differs from the issue of using fair value estimates in historical cost accounting. 
Historical cost accounting involves estimates, and estimates can be gamed. Market values can be used 
to discipline those estimates, not as a principled application of fair value accounting, but simply as a 
matter of rendering unbiased measurement under historical cost accounting. So, if there were a market 
in firm-specific law suits, for example, a market value might replace the liability estimate guided by 
FASB Statement No. 5. Or, if a market existed in instruments that replicated the payoffs for employee 
stock options, a market price might be preferred to an estimate of the grant-date compensation 
expense. Level 2 or 3 fair values, estimates as they are, are dubious for disciplining estimates under 
historical cost accounting, of course.  
 The principles bear on the use of market prices for these estimates, for most historical cost 
estimates are with respect to firm-specific value, not market value. Measuring warranty liabilities on 
the basis of a market value may not capture the efficiency of in-house customer service. Presumably a 
firm uses in-house services, rather than outsourcing to market bids, because of economies it achieves 
(and if the firm is relatively inefficient, that accounting should so reflect). In short, using a market 
price violates the one-to-one principle and would not true-up according to Principle 5. A market price 
for traded employee stock options (held by non-employees) might not capture the feature that options 
might be repriced or replaced for valuable employees (with retention in mind) if they are out of the 
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money. Clearly, there is a tradeoff between the bias so introduced and the bias possibly introduced by 
firm-specific estimates.  
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V. Learning from Market Solutions 
 
Mutual funds and hedge funds typically apply fair value accounting. They choose to do so voluntarily 
(with little regulation in the case of non-registered funds), as part of the contract between investors in 
the fund. Investors buy into the fund at book value based on fair value and redeem out of the fund at 
this same “net asset value.” Accordingly, they are willing to accept fair value as value to shareholders, 
with no perceived gains and losses for shareholders, new or old, in these transactions. That is, 
withdrawal from the fund at fair value is deemed to be a no-arbitrage (zero net-present-value) 
transaction. There has been little shareholder protest about the accounting for these funds.  
 We learn the following from this free-market accounting choice: 
1. Fair value accounting is chosen where shareholder welfare is determined by exposure to 
market prices, so Principle 1 is satisfied. 
 
2. The value of individual assets is not determined by the realized profits from sale of 
those assets; historical cost information does not enter the valuation, so Principle 3 is 
satisfied.  
 
3. These funds consist of net assets where the value of the fund is simply the sum of the 
values of individual assets and liabilities (with no value jointly determined), so 
Principle 2 is satisfied. If a fund takes canceling long and short positions, both are fair 
valued, so again Principle 2 is satisfied. 
 
4. Both unrealized and realized gains and losses are reported, so Principle 5 is satisfied 
 
5. Estimates of fair value are tolerated, but only to the extent that shareholders do not 
anticipate gains or losses to different classes of shareholders on withdrawal from the 
fund.  
 
6. The approximation in using fair value accounting for actively managed funds, discussed 
in Section IV, is typically accepted; shareholders withdraw from funds at book value 
even though additional value may be added from the settlement of positions after they 
leave.   
 
Point 5 is the most tentative. Hedge funds recognize estimation as being the rub of fair value 
accounting, and valuation committees, auditors, and boards spend considerable time on it. However, 
market solutions also emerge. If estimates are viewed as doubtful, fund managers place assets in side 
pockets or limit investments in illiquid assets to a small proportion of the fund. Lock-up periods are 
applied so that investors cannot withdraw until the uncertainly in the valuation is resolved. If 
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performance is seen as particularly important, the realization principle is applied – an important 
difference in accounting in moving from a hedge fund to a private equity fund, for example.  
 This behavior of investors in their self-interest is a guide for accounting more generally, and for 
regulators designing solutions for shareholders. However, shareholders in business corporations do not 
redeem directly from the firm at call, but rather through the sales of their claims in secondary markets 
(a stock repurchase forced by shareholder activism aside). Thus mechanisms like lock-ups are not 
available as protection against the imperfections of fair value accounting. This argues for a stricter 
adherence to the five principles so that the share price at which a shareholder redeems reflects an 
accounting based on value added for shareholders.52 Historical cost accounting can be seen as placing 
assets and liabilities in a side pocket in the accounts, to be marked to market only when a sale is 
realized. Or, to use the other analogy, historical cost applies the accounting used in private equity 
rather than a hedge fund when the principles are not satisfied.53 
 Point 6 advises on the use of fair value accounting in Case C1b of the active investor, discussed 
in the last section, where the principles are strictly violated but an approximation may be acceptable. In 
investment funds, the approximation appears to be adopted under the following circumstances:54 
(i) The fund manager can sell the security at the market price, on call; that is, little 
performance is necessary to find a customer. 
 
(ii) Performance involves only a timing issue, that is, when to sell. 
 
                                                 
52 For closed-end mutual funds, shareholders redeem in the secondary market rather than at net asset value. For these funds, 
some evidence suggests there is little difference between the pricing (in the secondary market) of estimated fair values and 
those based on quoted prices from active markets. See T. Carroll, T. Linsmeier, and K. Petroni, “The Reliability if Fair 
Value versus Historical Cost Information: Evidence from Closed-End Mutual Funds,” Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance, 18 (Winter, 2003), 1-23. However, for banks and insurance companies, evidence suggests that fair values of debt 
and equity securities obtained from active markets are related to these firms’ share prices, but those estimated from thinly 
traded markets are not. See M. Barth, “Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Investment Securities and the Market 
Valuation of Banks,” The Accounting Review 69 (January 2004), 1-25 and K. Petroni and J. Whalen, “Fair Values of Equity 
and Debt Securities and Share Prices of Property-liability Insurers,” Journal of Risk and Insurance (December 1995), 719-
737. 
 
53 One might argue that experience with fair value accounting outside of investment funds does not particularly recommend 
it. The Enron episode comes to mind. But that was not entirely market-based behavior. Fair value accounting for gas 
contracts was approved by the SEC in 1992. Though license was presumably taken, management, auditors and other agents 
acted under this sanction. Presumably, fair value accounting would not have been adopted at Enron (and approved by the 
auditors) if it were not part of GAAP. 
 
54 The cynic might say that the approximation is acceptable because investors don’t really expect funds to add value to 
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Real estate investment trusts involved in speculation also mark to market even though some timing 
performance is required to arbitrage prices as part of the speculative endeavor. These two conditions 
appear to hold approximately for these trusts, though real estate markets may be less liquid than 
security markets. One can imagine situations where the approximation would not be appropriate: The 
long-term investor sees the “reversion of prices to fundamental value” as taking some time, and so 
views fair value accounting as introducing a short-term focus. One can also imagine prices deviating 
further from fundamental value (as in Case C1b and in a sustained price bubble or a “depressed 
market”), in which case the approximation would produce perverse results. However, despite these 
prospects, fund investors see an advantage of using fair value accounting rather than waiting for 
realization.55 
                                                 
55 Archival research also examines experience with fair value accounting. Some of this research in reviewed in W. 
Landsman, “Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Some Implications for Bank Regulation,” Bank of 
International Settlements Working Paper No. 209, August 2006 and M. Barth, Research and Global Financial Reporting 
(Foundations and Trends in Accounting, 2006), at http://www.nowpublishers.com/product.aspx?product=ACC. Our 
companion document, Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Industry reports on research on fair value accounting in the 
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VI. Summary: When Fair Value Accounting Is Applicable 
 
The reasoning of Sections III and IV and the market solutions observed in Section V lead to the 
following statement of conditions for fair value accounting to be applicable: 
 
1. Value for shareholders is determined solely by exposure to market prices, with no 
performance involved by the firm. This strict condition can be relaxed in the case of 
active investing in marketable securities when the following conditions hold: 
 
(i) The investment manager can sell the security at the market price on call; 
that is, little performance is necessary to find a customer. 
 
(ii) Performance involves only a timing issue, that is, when to sell. 
 
2. Prices are not informed by historical cost accounting. 
 
3. Fair value is determined at an aggregate level of net assets that are jointly employed 
under a business plan.  
 
A fourth condition governs cases where market prices are not directly available and hypothetical prices 
replace them.  
4.   Estimated fair values satisfy the following requirements:  
 
(i) Estimates are based on prices in active, contemporaneous comparison 
markets. 
 
(ii) The firm cannot arbitrage prices in the comparison market. 
 
(iii) The valuation technique used to make the estimates is constrained by no-
arbitrage assumptions. 
                 
Given that estimates can admit bias, the following feature enhances the integrity of fair value 
accounting: 
5. Fair values must be reported with a truing up of fair value gains and losses against 
realized gains and losses. 
 
These five principles come with a warning. Fair values based on market prices can bring bubble prices 
into the financial statements, with the consequence that the accounting not only becomes less 
informative, but feeds inefficient prices. We do not view the accountant’s role as one of determining 
whether a given market price is efficient or not, so see no way of dealing with this issue under fair 
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value accounting. It is, however, an undesirable feature that must be recognized in interpreting the 
information in fair value accounting financial statements.  
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VII. Reporting Fair Values for Different Industries 
 
The five principles apply to some types of assets and liabilities but not to others. This section lays out 
suggested formats for financial statements that distinguish the application of fair value accounting and 
historical transaction accounting. As types of assets and liabilities differ over industries, the format is 
adapted to selected industries. 
 
Balance Sheet and Income Statement Presentation 
The Balance Sheet 
Assets and liabilities have a very different interpretation under fair value accounting, so balance sheets 
should distinguish  those  at  fair value from those at historical cost.  The division is between assets and  
 
EXHIBIT 9.  The Balance Sheet 
Net assets employed in the business: 
 
 Net assets exposed to price movements: 
 Assets at fair value  XXX 
 Liabilities at fair value  (XXX) 
 Net exposure to price movements  XXX 
 
 Net assets involved in trading with customers: 
 Business assets at historical cost XXX 
 Business liabilities at historical cost (XXX)   
 XXX           
 Net business assets at fair value  XXX 
 Net deferred gains on net business assets 
    carried at fair value  (XXX)     XXX 
 
 Total net business assets  XXX 
 
Net assets in financing activities: 
 Marketable securities (excess cash) at fair value  XXX 
            Financing debt settled at contractual amounts 
 (at historical cost)  (XXX)   
 Financing debt settled at market price  
 (at fair value)  (XXX)  XXX 
 
Shareholders’ equity  XXX 
 
 
liabilities where shareholder value comes from exposure to the market prices (according to Principle 
1), and those where assets and liabilities are inputs into the productive process. See Exhibit 9. The 
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netting of assets and liabilities whose value comes from exposure to market prices enforces the 
matching required by Principle 2. The netting of assets and liabilities involved in trading with 
customers renders the number for the denominator of the rate of return from the business with 
customers. Total net business assets are separated from assets and liabilities involved in financing the 
business (borrowing and storing excess cash). With this presentation, the analyst quickly identifies that 
part of the business that is already valued by the accountants (where the P/B = 1) from that where 
earnings forecasting is required to complete the valuation.  
 Net assets involved in trading with customers are carried at historical cost, with one exception: 
Net assets whose (individual) value results (solely) from exposure to market prices, but are employed 
as part of the business model for trading with customers, are carried at fair value. Instruments that 
hedge historical cost income (such as currency hedges) come to mind, and Principle 2 requires these to 
be part of the portfolio of business assets. However Principle 2 also requires that gains and losses on 
these instruments be matched to the income which they support, so net unrealized gains are reported as 
unearned – a net liability like deferred revenue – to be matched against the historical cost income with 
the appropriate timing. The reporting of a liability differs from the requirements of the FASB 
Statement No. 133 on derivatives where the unrealized gains and losses are recorded as equity.56 
Clearly, these gains and losses are not changes in equity value if they are offset by expected gains or 
losses in historical cost income yet to be reported. The pooling of these unrealized gains and losses in 
“other comprehensive income” with other unrealized fair value gains and losses (under FASB 
Statement No. 133) aggregates amounts that are not one-for-one increases in shareholder value with 
amounts from fair valuing assets whose changes in market price are dollar-for-dollar additions to 
shareholder value. The advocated presentation is not an accommodation to deal with a so-called 
“mixed-attribute model” but rather an implementation of historical cost accounting in much the same 
way as receipt of value from customers, measured at exit prices, gives rise to deferred revenues to 
effect matching. The “mixed-attribute model” problem is a straw man. 
 In the financing section, marketable securities (financial assets that store excess cash) are fair 
valued, for the firm has no input into their price and a change in market price changes value dollar-for-
dollar (Principle 1). Contractual debt is carried at historical cost, consistent with Principle 2, as the 
matched assets whose value change may induce a change in the value of the debt is not fair valued. 
However, as discussed under Principle 2 in Section III, there is an argument for marking contractual 
                                                 
56 See FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, op. cit. 
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debt to market on a change in credit quality (and recognizing corresponding gains and losses in the 
income statement) if the matched decline in the value of corresponding assets is captured in the 
historical cost operating income (with the reporting of a loss, for example). One might also strip out 
gains and losses on financing debt that are due to changes in interest rates (a market exposure), as 
entertained in Section IV, and net them against gains and losses on marketable (debt) securities. But 
changes in interest rates may (possibly) be correlated with changes in credit spreads and (probably) 
with an (unrecorded) change in the value of business assets, violating Principle 2. Indeed, interest rates 
not only affect discount rates (on debt and equity), but are also correlated with subsequent earnings on 
business assets.57 Debt settled at market price – convertible debt, call and put options, stock warrants, 
and stock appreciation rights (for example) that, from a shareholder’s perspective, are liabilities – are 
carried at fair value, for the amount of the obligation is determined by exposure to market prices 
(usually the price of the firm’s own stock).58 Instruments that are part of the financing activity but 
whose value changes (solely) with changes in market prices – interest rate hedges, for example – are 
also included in the financing section at fair value, but with deferred gains and losses recorded as net 
liabilities to effect appropriate matching.  
  
 The Income Statement 
The accounting system reports comprehensive income, but historical cost income has a very different 
interpretation than fair value income (as Section II explains), so the two must be reported as distinct 
components of comprehensive income. A dollar of fair value income is worth a dollar, but that from 
the productive process takes on a multiplier. The following presentation makes a clean separation. 
Again, the netting of gains and losses of fair value assets reinforces the asset-liability matching. The 
truing-up of Principle 5 can be operationalized by a supplementary reporting of realized gains and 
losses against recognized unrealized gains and losses. In the financing section, gains and losses on 
changes in fair value can be separated into a current market interest rate (yield) applied to beginning-
of-period fair values (the expected return) and the remaining change in market price plus coupon (the 
unexpected return). The (historical cost) effective interest method applies to contractual debt unless the 
debt is marked to market (see the discussion on the balance sheet). To keep it simple, taxes are not 
                                                 
57 See D. Nissim and S. Penman, “The Association between Changes in Interest Rates, Earnings, and Equity Values,” 
Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (Winter 2003), 775-804.  
 
58 CEASA White Paper No. 1, op.cit. covers the accounting for these obligations. 
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included in the dummy financial statement. They, of course, must be reported and allocated to the 
different components of income so all incorporate the taxes they attract. 
 
EXHIBIT 10. The Income Statement 
 
Income from trading with customers: 
  
 Revenues XXX 
 Expenses incurred in generating revenue (XXX) 
 Matched recognized gains and losses on fair value 
             assets utilized in trading with customers XXX 
 Net income from trading with customers XXX 
 
Income from exposure to market prices: 
  
 Fair value gains XXX 
 Matched fair value losses (XXX) XXX  
 
Net income from business activities XXX 
 
Income from financing activities: 
 Fair value gains (losses) on mkt. securities XXX 
              Interest expense on contractual debt                           (XXX)    
 Fair value gains and losses on debt  
 settled at market price XXX XXX 
 
Comprehensive income XXX    
  
 
As the equity analyst gets the value of the fair value operation from the balance sheet, he or she 
ignores that portion of the income statement and focuses on the historical cost section, cleanly 
separated from fair value income.   
 
Fair Value Accounting for a Non-Financial Firm 
Non-financial firms – industrials, service firms, and the like – employ a business model where value is 
added through a production process for delivery to customers, so fair value accounting has little 
impact. But there are exceptions. The trading securities recognize that some firms have equity 
investments that are part of a portfolio operation, rather than an operating investment in another firm. 
All other equity investments are recorded at historical cost assets (under the equity method or 
proportional consolidation). Although pension liabilities are estimates, not strictly fair values, their 
matching against pension assets at fair value yields a net that indicates the exposure of the net funding 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Center for Excellence in Accounting & Security Analysis 57 
position to changes in market prices. Gains and losses on pension assets are actual returns, not the 
expected returns reported under the FASB’s pension standard, No. 87, though expected returns can be 
separated from unexpected returns (so the expected component can be compared with the interest costs 
on the pension liability, with the unexpected component capturing the windfall gain or loss).59 Service 
costs and interest costs are reported as expenses in generating revenue here. Just as cost of goods sold 
includes implicit interest on payables, so business expenses include implicit interest on pension 
obligations. However, one can envision an accounting where all interest on operating liabilities, 
implicit and explicit, is recognized and reported as a separate component of the income statement. 
 
EXHIBIT 11. A Balance Sheet for an Industrial Firm 
Net assets employed in the business: 
 
 Net assets exposed to price movements: 
 Trading securities at fair value XXX 
 Pension assets at fair value XXX 
 Estimated pension liabilities (XXX) XXX 
 Net exposure to price movements XXX 
 
Net assets involved in trading with customers: 
 Business assets at historical cost XXX 
 Business liabilities at historical cost (XXX)   
 XXX           
 Net business assets at fair value XXX 
 Net deferred gains on net business assets 
 carried at fair value (XXX) XXX 
 
 Total net business assets XXX 
 
 
Net assets in financing activities: 
 Marketable securities (excess cash) at fair value XXX 
            Financing debt  settled at contractual amounts 
 (at historical cost) (XXX)   
 Financing debt settled at market price           
 (at fair value) (XXX) XXX 
 





                                                 
59 CEASA’s forthcoming White Paper on pension accounting deals with the presentation of pension accounts in detail.  
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EXHIBIT 12.  An Income Statement for an Industrial Firm 
Income from trading with customers: 
 Revenues       XXX 
 Expenses incurred in generating revenue             (XXX) 
         XXX 
 Matched recognized gains and losses on fair value 
              assets utilized in trading with customers                              XXX 
 Net income from trading with customers                            XXX 
 
 
Income from exposure to market prices: 
 Fair value gains and losses on trading securities   XXX 
 Fair value gains and losses on pension assets       (XXX) XXX  
 
Net income from business activities     XXX 
 
 
Income from financing activities: 
 Fair value gains and losses on mkt. securities        XXX 
 Interest expense on contractual debt                      (XXX)    
 Fair value gains and losses on debt  
               settled at market price                                          XXX       XXX 
 
Comprehensive income      XXX   
 
Fair Value Accounting for Banks 
The companion document, Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Industry addresses fair value 
accounting for bank holding companies.  
 
Fair Value Accounting for Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies engage in underwriting and also manage investment portfolios that serve as 
reserves. The value of the reserves is determined by exposure to market prices. The value of the 
underwriting business is determined by how well management chooses customers to insure and set 
premiums relative to the risk borne. So fair value accounting is applied to the investment portfolio 
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EXHIBIT 13.  A Balance Sheet for an Insurance Company 
 
Net assets employed in the business: 
 
  
Investment portfolio at fair value: 
 Fixed-income investments, at fair value         XXX 
 Equity investments, at fair value     XXX 
 Derivatives covering exposure of investments to market prices,  
               at fair value                                                                                      XXX 
 Value of investment portfolio exposed to price movements            XXX 
 
 Net assets involved in underwriting operations with customers: 
 Assets: 
 Operating cash                                                                    XXX 
 Reinsurance recoverable on unpaid claims                        XXX 
 Prepaid reinsurance claims                                                 XXX 
 Deferred policy acquisition costs                                       XXX 
 Property                                                                              XXX 
 Equity investment in subsidiaries                                      XXX 
    Total underwriting assets at historical cost                     XXX 
 Instruments covering insurance risks, at fair value            XXX 
               Total underwriting assets                                                XXX 
 
 Liabilities: 
 Unpaid claims                                                       XXX 
 Unearned premiums                                              XXX 
 Accrued expenses                                                 XXX 
 Net deferred gains on instruments covering  
      insurance risks carried at fair value                  XXX    XXX      XXX      
   
 Total net business assets                                                                   XXX                                       
 
Net assets in financing activities: 
 Marketable securities (excess cash) at fair value              XXX 
            Financing debt settled at contractual amounts 
    (at historical cost)                                           (XXX)   
 Financing debt settled at market price           
               (at fair value)                                                                (XXX)     XXX 
 
Shareholders’ equity                          XXX 
 
 
 Derivatives covering exposure to price risk in the investment portfolio are in the investment 
section of the balance sheet (at fair value) while those hedging insurance risks appear (at fair value) in 
the underwriting section, with unrealized net gains on the latter carried as deferred gains to be matched 
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against the relevant underwriting income or expense in the income statement in subsequent periods. 
All other underwriting assets and liabilities are carried at historical cost. Equity investments in the 
investment portfolio are carried at fair value, while those that are investments in (insurance) 
subsidiaries are carried at historical cost using the equity method or proportional consolidation.  
 Corresponding to the balance sheet divisions, the income statement separates income from 
underwriting  from investment income,  along with  net  income  from  financing activities.  The spread  
 
EXHIBIT 14.  An Income Statement for an Insurance Company 
 
Income from underwriting: 
 Premiums earned       XXX 
 Insurance losses                 (XXX) 
 Amortization of deferred policy acquisition costs             (XXX) 
 Operating expenses                 (XXX) 
          XXX 
 Matched fair value gains and losses on instruments 
    utilized in insurance operations                                                       XXX 
 Net income from trading with customers                                        XXX 
 
Income from investments: 
 Net gains from investment portfolio market to fair value   XXX 
 Net gains on derivatives covering investment assets          XXX       XXX 
 Net business income        XXX 
 
Income from financing activities: 
 Fair value gains and losses on mkt. securities                    XXX 
 Interest expense on contractual debt                                  (XXX)    
 Fair value gains and losses on debt  
               settled at market price                                                       XXX       XXX 
 
Comprehensive income                   XXX   
 
 
between premiums and insurance losses (and operating expenses) reports the outcome of trading with 
customers for the period. Income from investments is comprehensive, and so is not available for 
“cherry picking.” With the value of the investments provided by the balance sheet, the equity analyst 
can ignore the investment section of the income statement and focus on valuing the underwriting 
business based on income clearly separated out in this income statement.  
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Appendix A: Statements For and Against Fair Value Accounting 
 
Some of the following quotes are those reported in the press and the context is not always apparent. In 
particular, the extent of the application of fair value accounting that the speaker has in mind is not 
always clear. So there is some risk of misconstruing the statements.  
 
Arguments Offered for Fair Value Accounting 
The Board believes fair values for financial assets and financial liabilities provide more 
relevant and understandable information than cost or cost-based measures. The Board 
considers fair value to be more relevant to financial statement users than cost for assessing the 
current financial position of an entity because fair value reflects the current cash equivalent of 
the entity’s financial instruments rather than the price of a past transaction. With the passage 
of time, historical prices become irrelevant in assessing an entity’s current financial position. 
 
---FASB Exposure Draft, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial 
Liabilities—Including an Amendment of FASB Statement No. 115 (January 25, 2006, page 
8; Appendix A, section A3). 
 
I think it is hard to argue with the conceptual merits of fair value as the most relevant 
measurement attribute. Certainly, to those who say that accounting should better reflect true 
economic substance, fair value, rather than historical cost, would generally seem to be the 
better measure.  
 
---Robert Herz, Chairman of the Financial Accounting Stands Board in CFO Magazine, 
February 2003, page 40, quoting from a speech at a conference of Financial Executives 
International. 
 
I know what an asset is. I can see one, I can touch one, or I can see representations of one. I 
also know what liabilities are. On the other hand, I believe that revenues, expenses, gains, and 
losses are accounting constructs. I can’t say that I see a revenue going down the street. And so 
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has to be assets and liabilities.  
 
--- Thomas Linsmeier, Member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, in “Will Fair 
Value Fly?” on CFO.com, September 20, 2006. 
 
How do we take control of the reported numbers out of the hands of corporate management? 
We do it by requiring that the reported numbers for assets and liabilities, including guaranties 
and commitments, be based on estimated current market prices – current cash selling prices for 
assets and current cash settlement prices for liabilities. …………I recommend that there be a 
sense of the Congress resolution that corporate balance sheets must present the reporting 
corporation’s true economic financial condition through mark-to-market accounting for 
corporate assets and liabilities.  
 
---Walter P. Schuetze, former Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission, in 
testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, February 26, 2002. 
 
Conceptually, fair value is a market-based measurement that is not affected by factors specific 
to a particular entity. Accordingly, it represents an unbiased measurement that is consistent 
from period to period and across entities. 
 
---FASB Exposure Draft, Fair Value Measurements, Proposed Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard (June 23, 2004, page 27; Appendix C, Section C2. 
 
Information about fair value better enables investors, creditors, and other users to assess the 
consequences of an entity’s investment and financing strategies, that is, to assess its 
performance. 
 
---FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 107, Disclosures about Fair 
Value of Financial Instruments (December 1991, page 17, paragraph 41). 
 
The Staff recommends the continued exploration of the feasibility of reporting all financial 
instruments at fair value. Supporters of greater use of fair values on the balance sheet argue 
that  the  most  useful   information   is   that  which  reflects  the  current  values  of assets  and  
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obligations. 
 
 ---Securities and Exchange Commission, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to 
Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet 
Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers (June 15, 
2005, page 4) 
 
Fair value provides important information about financial assets and liabilities as compared to 
values based only on their historical cost (original price paid or received). Since fair value 
reflects current market conditions, it provides comparability of the value of financial 
instruments bought at different times. In addition, financial disclosures that use fair value 
provide investors with insight into prevailing market values, further helping to ensure the 
usefulness of financial reports.  
 
--- The Bond Market Association, International Swaps & Derivatives Association, 
Securities Industry Association, Explanation and Benefits of Fair Value Accounting (March 
26, 2002, page 3) 
 
A fair value option would enable entities to avoid reporting volatility in earnings that results 
from using different measurement attributes in reporting various financial assets and financial 
liabilities that are related. The effect on earnings from using mixed measurement attributes 
under U.S. GAAP may not be representative of the economics of the reporting entity’s 
activities. 
 
--- FASB Exposure Draft, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial 
Liabilities—Including an amendment of FASB Statement No. 115 (January 25, 2006, page 
7; Appendix A, section A3) 
 
Fair value information in the only information relevant for financial decision making ... Fair 
value measures reflect the most current and complete estimations of the value of the asset or 
obligation, including the amounts, timing, and riskiness of the future cash flows attributable to 
the asset or obligation.  
 
--- A Comprehensive Business Reporting Model: Financial Reporting for Investors (CFA 
Institute, Center for Financial Market Integrity, October 2005). 
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It is axiomatic that it is better to know what something is worth now than what it is worth at 
some time in the past…Historical cost itself is in reality historic market value, the amount of a 
past transaction engaged in by the firm …Historic cost data are never comparable on a firm-
to-firm basis because the costs were incurred at different dates by different firms (or even 
within a single firm). There is no financial analyst who would not want to know the market 
value of individual assets and liabilities. 
 
--- Financial Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond (Association for Investment Management 
Research, 1993), page 39. 
 
Where feasible, fair value provides the best information to investors. Obviously, this can 
involve assumptions if there are no fair-market prices [available]. But if all the assumptions 
are disclosed, that brings a good deal of light to the process.  
 
--- Rebecca McEnally, Vice-president of advocacy for the CFA Institute, in CFO magazine, 
February 2003, page 40. 
 
The mixed-attribute model has prompted a significant amount of accounting-motivated 
transaction structures. For example, as noted above, some sales of financial assets seem 
motivated primarily by a desire to recognize gains that could not otherwise be recognized, by 
selling (at least for accounting purposes) receivables, available-for-sale securities, cost method 
investments, or other financial assets that are not recognized at fair value with changes 
recorded in earnings. Others seem designed to change the assets’ form into assets with a 
different measurement basis in order to minimize income statement volatility, match the 
measurement basis of assets with that of liabilities, or for other reasons. Similarly, investments 
in the stock of other entities are often designed to either achieve or avoid use of the equity 
method of accounting. In many of the accounting-motivated transactions noted above, the 
motivation for the transaction or the structuring could be essentially eliminated if all financial 
instruments were recorded at fair value. 
 
--- Securities and Exchange Commission, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to 
Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance 
Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers  
(June 15, 2005,  page 110) 
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Fair value measurements provide more transparency than historical cost based 
measurements… In summary, let me reiterate that: Only one model should exist for measuring 
financial instruments; that model is fair value. 
 
--- Speech by SEC Staff: “Fair Value Accounting– Let's Work Together and Get It Done!” 
Remarks by Jackson M. Day, Deputy Chief Accountant, Office of the Chief Accountant, 
SEC. (28th Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, December 5, 
2000) 
 
Potential advantages - Fair Value: Consistency with assets. If insurance company investments 
are to be reported at fair value, then its insurance liabilities should be too. This consistent 
treatment across the entire balance sheet would prevent false volatility in reported earnings 
and equity; Eliminate accounting arbitrage. Valuation of insurance liabilities at other than 
what they are worth in the market creates incentives to manage earnings through sales of these 
liabilities, even when done at non-economic prices; Consistency with other financial 
instruments. To the extent that non-insurance financial liabilities are similar to insurance 
liabilities, they should be accounted for similarly; Otherwise, the inconsistent accounting rules 
could create competitive advantages based strictly on the accounting, not the economics; 
Relevance. As the value at which such liabilities could be extinguished or traded, fair value 
should be the most relevant measure for investors. 
 
----CAS Task Force on Fair Value Liabilities, White Paper on Fair Valuing 
Property/Casualty Insurance Liabilities, Casualty Actuarial Society, page 9, 2002, 
available at http://www.casact.org/research/tffvl 
 
Arguments Made Against Fair Value Accounting 
If markets were liquid and transparent for all assets and liabilities, fair value accounting 
clearly would be reliable information useful in the decision-making process. However, because 
many assets and liabilities do not have an active market, the inputs and methods for estimating 
their fair value are more subjective and, therefore, the valuations less reliable. Research by 
Federal Reserve staff shows that fair value estimates for bank loans can vary greatly, 
depending on the valuation inputs and methodology used…The FASB statement on the 
proposed fair value standard suggests that reliability can be significantly enhanced if market 
inputs are used in valuation. However, because management uses significant judgment in 
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selecting market inputs when market prices are not available, reliability will continue to be an 
issue…In our role as a bank supervisor, we have observed that minor changes in a number of 
assumptions in a pricing model can have a substantial effect. Generally, we are comfortable 
with the fair value measurement process for liquid trading instruments that financial 
institutions have had significant experience in valuing. However, we believe that for less-liquid 
assets and liabilities, reliability is a significant concern.  
 
--- Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, to the International Association of Credit Portfolio 
Managers General Meeting, New York, November 18, 2004. 
 
Reliability of information is to be determined on the basis of faithful representation of the 
economic reality rather than the legal form of transactions, and should be prudent, complete 
and free from bias.  While active and liquid markets may exist for many financial instruments, 
principally debt securities, equities and certain derivatives, there is no market of any substance 
for loans and deposits…The fair value measurement of own debt would mean that a 
deterioration in a bank’s credit rating would result in an accounting profit reflecting the fall in 
the discounted value of its liabilities…Full fair value measurement is perceived to be necessary 
because of the subjectivity caused by the mixed attribute approach and problems associated 
with similar instruments being measured on two different bases. The division between trading 
and non-trading activity in banks, however, is clearly understood, is fully documented and has 
proven operable and capable of audit throughout the 1990s. By contrast, the fair value 
measurement of the banking book is dependent upon the estimation of value in the absence of 
market information and involves assumptions about liquidity, credit standing, collateral and 
customer behavior. It is difficult to see how it can be described as being more objective than 
the current measurement base.   
 
--- “Fair Value Accounting: an Industry View,” Paul Chisnall, Director, British Bankers’ 
Association; Financial Stability Review, December 2000. 
 
Potential disadvantages - Fair Value: Difficulty in measuring. The calculation of reliable fair 
value adjustments may be a difficult task, and may not always be possible; Greater estimation 
reliance. Fair value accounting systems increase the number of estimates underlying the 
reported financials. This raises questions as to potential estimation error, and even 
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manipulation of estimates; Volatility in earnings. Liabilities held at fair value may show much 
greater volatility, due to changing yield curves and risk adjustments, versus undiscounted or 
conservatively discounted liabilities. This additional volatility may provide more noise than 
information to capital providers and other users of financial statements; Cost. Implementation 
and maintenance of a fair value accounting system will cost time and resources. There may be 
other alternatives that cost less, and do not have all the disadvantages mentioned above, while 
still maintaining many of the advantages of fair value accounting; Uncertainty. Fair value 
accounting has never been implemented for insurance liabilities, or other liabilities for which 
there are no active markets. There will inevitably be some unintended or unexpected 
consequences from its implementation.  
 
--- CAS Task Force on Fair Value Liabilities, White Paper on Fair Valuing 
Property/Casualty Insurance Liabilities, Casualty Actuarial Society, page 9, 2002, 
available at http://www.casact.org/research/tffvl. 
 
Applying the fair value option to the reporting entity’s liabilities poses a particular problem, 
especially from a prudential point of view. As, under the fair value option, fair value 
measurement is not restricted to market developments (e.g. market interest rate fluctuations or 
changes in the exchange rate parities), but is all-encompassing, i.e. it also includes fluctuations 
caused by changes in the reporting entity’s credit rating, a deterioration in the reporting 
entity’s credit rating and the resultant devaluation of its own liabilities leads to an increase in 
its capital. From a prudential point of view, this is unacceptable.  
 
--- Deutsche Bundesbank, Banking and Financial Supervision Department Frankfurt am 
Main, Comment Letter on Exposure Draft of Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, “The Fair Value Option,” 30 July 2004. 
 
There are serious doubts that an adequate fair value can be determined for bank loans, which 
are non-negotiable instruments precisely because they embody elements that cannot be easily 
quantified in a standardised manner. First, there are, by definition, no secondary markets for 
these instruments. This is particularly true where credit risk markets do not appear to be 
sufficiently deep and liquid for the purpose concerned.  
 
---European Central Bank. Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Sector. 
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There are a number of complex measurement issues that first need to be explored. In order to 
ensure that the ‘fair value’ was one recognised by banks, measurement of value for 
unmarketable assets would have to rely heavily on internal processes. Although this would 
raise issues about validation and consistency across banks, a fair value that the banks did not 
recognise could create marked distortions in behaviour.  
 
---“Fair value accounting, capital standards, expected loss provisioning, and financial 
stability”, Financial Stability Review, June 2000. Patricia Jackson and David Lodge, 
Regulatory Policy Division, Bank of England, page 122. 
 
The fourth drawback is the potential disruption to market discipline caused by the reduction of 
comparability and reliability of financial statements across financial institutions. Under FFVA, 
when there is no observable market value then valuation models are used. Fair values obtained 
by these models should be based on inputs from liquid markets in order to reduce the scope for 
possible manipulation. At present a variety of valuation models coexist with varied inputs and 
assumptions, and this may significantly reduce comparability if used indiscriminately across 
banks and across balance-sheet items. Furthermore, it should also be mentioned that the date 
and purpose of the valuation is critical in establishing a fair market value. A valuation is 
determined for a particular point in time, and generally should not be relied upon for other 
dates. In the same vein, a valuation is usually performed for a particular purpose and generally 
may not be appropriate for another purpose… Moreover, given the current state of the art, 
particularly with regard to credit risk models, reliability in financial statements could be 
negatively affected. Indeed, fair values do not always convey precise information concerning a 
bank’s risk profile, thus hindering market discipline that requires reliable information in order 
to be effective. Misjudgement can trigger overreaction, which can have a negative impact on 
the financial situation of a firm.  
 
---European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2004, Fair Value 
Accounting and Financial Stability, pages 7-9. 
 
…the fifth drawback focuses on the limited reliability of present bank estimates of probabilities 
of default (PDs) for accounting purposes. In its comments on the work of the JWG, the Federal 
Reserve Board questioned the reliability and objectivity of fair values estimated using market 
credit spreads and internal models. Indeed, there are serious limitations on the use of credit 
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market information as there is a large dispersion in observed credit spreads for rated debt 
within each risk grade and for a given maturity for lower-rated debt categories. Even between 
bank loans and bond obligations with the same obligor, differences in observed credit spreads 
are large and varied. Meanwhile, internal credit risk rating systems may produce valuable 
information reflecting banks’ risk management needs, but they are not suitable for managing 
loan portfolios on a market-value basis.  
 
---European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2004, Fair Value 
Accounting and Financial Stability, pages 7-9. 
 
The fact that management uses significant judgment in the valuation process, particularly for 
level-3 estimates, adds to our concerns about reliability. Management bias, whether intentional 
or unintentional, may result in inappropriate fair value measurements and misstatements of 
earnings and equity capital. This was the case in the overvaluation of certain residual tranches 
in securitizations in recent years, when there was no active market for these assets. Significant 
write-downs of overstated asset valuations have resulted in the failure of a number of finance 
companies and depository institutions. Similar problems have occurred due to overvaluations 
in nonbank trading portfolios that resulted in overstatements of income and equity. As you are 
aware, the possibility for management bias exists today. We continue to see news stories about 
charges of earnings manipulation, even under the historical cost accounting framework. We 
believe that, without reliable fair value estimates, the potential for misstatements in financial 
statements prepared using fair value measurements will be even greater. 
 
…verification of valuations that are not based on observable market prices is very 
challenging…estimates based on judgments will likely be difficult to verify. 
 
--- Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, to the International Association of Credit Portfolio 
Managers General Meeting, New York,  November 18, 2004. 
 
Relevance is described as information having relevance to the decision-making needs of users 
and there is an expectation that relevant information will have either predictive or 
confirmatory value. It is recognised that value can be represented on different bases, such as 
historical cost, replacement cost or net realisable value, and that supporting information may 
need to be given…Fair values take us away from the earnings process as they bear little 
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relationship to contracted future cash flows. Gains and losses would be recognised in 
accordance with short-term market movements and not when income has been earned or a loss 
incurred. The resulting information would largely be theoretical as a large commercial bank 
could not realise directly the difference between the carrying value and the fair value of its 
loan book. Users of accounts would not therefore be given a better insight into the management 
of the business.  
 
---Fair Value Accounting: an industry view, Paul Chisnall, Director, British Bankers’ 
Association, Financial Stability Review, December 2000. 
 
FVA principles do not reflect properly the way in which banks manage their core business, 
namely the granting of loans. The essence of ban management in this area lies in taking long-
term decisions about credit quality and concentration and fostering customer relationships 
over the life of the contracts. It is less concerned about short-term variations that represent the 
basis for the use of FVA principles. Therefore, there is the possibility that the introduction of 
FVA for the banking book might in principle create incentives for banks to alter their core 
business. This would be the case if banks decided to reduce their exposure to increased 
volatility of income (stemming from the accounting recognition of interest rate risk in the 
banking book) by shortening the average maturity of loans. Other ways to achieve the same 
goal would be the recourse to hedging techniques and the increased use of variable interest 
rates. The decision to reduce the average maturity of loans would depend also on other factors, 
including the nature of customer demand and the specific cost structure of individual banks. 
 
---European Central Bank, Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Sector. 
 
The existing mixed-measurement approach is fully understood by professional users who have 
developed extensive financial management tools to analyse performance using the historical 
cost data given for loan portfolios. Loan portfolios, investment securities and trading books are 
all judged according to their business purpose and supporting information about gains and 
losses from sales within the banking book and sensitivity analyses are factored into the overall 
assessment of a bank’s performance. Users – and management – are also interested in net 
interest income and key ratios such as interest yield, spread and margin. Net interest income is 
the difference between interest received from interest-earning assets and interest paid on 
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interest-bearing liabilities, including free and low-cost funds. These performance indicators 
are calculated using historical cost data reflecting the amounts or rates actually received and 
paid and fully tie into the earnings process. While banks are likely to conclude that these 
figures would still need to be given on an historical cost basis, their relegation to supporting 
disclosure based on an alternative value system would over time debase their worth.  
 
---Fair Value Accounting: an Industry View”, Paul Chisnall, Director, British Bankers’ 
Association, Financial Stability Review, December 2000. 
 
The cost could be a potential increase in the intrinsic pro-cyclicality of bank lending, as more 
accentuated increases in bank profits and capital during upturns would support the 
overextension of credit, that would then create the conditions for a deeper and more 
longlasting downturn. This would then also be exacerbated by the effect that downward 
adjustments in asset valuations would have on bank profits and capital, which would further 
restrain their lending. Moreover, another potential result would be to limit credit availability to 
counterparties whose credit status is more volatile, e.g. small and mediumsized enterprises 
(SME). Given the importance of SMEs in Europe this may have a detrimental effect on future 
economic developments. 
 
 ---European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2004, Fair Value 
Accounting and Financial Stability, pages 7-8. 
 
The second drawback relates to the role of banks in maturity and liquidity transformation. The 
joint provision of deposits and loans puts banks in a position to provide liquidity on demand 
and support the needs of other components of the financial sector and of the economy as a 
whole, also in times of distress. This role is fundamentally linked to the opaque nature of the 
value of bank assets resulting from the non-marketability of loan contracts. It is argued that the 
attempt to introduce fair values for loans fails to recognise a permanent and positive feature of 
banking, i.e. its contribution to the overcoming of informational asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers. In this line of reasoning, FFVA might drive banks to forego their fundamental 
function. As the accounting framework would not reflect their “lend and hold” attitude towards 
credit extension, banks would face an incentive to hedge, securitise, or shift the risk to 
customers (e.g., via floatingrate or shorter-term loans) in order to move towards a matched 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Center for Excellence in Accounting & Security Analysis 72 
composition of their liabilities. The potential cost to the financial system would be that liquidity 
and maturity transformation would be more limited in scope, as interest rate changes would be 
directly reflected in the profit and loss (P&L) accounts. In this perspective, FFVA could 
encourage banks to unduly emphasise short-term results at the expense of long-term customer 
relationships and investment needs.  
 
---European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2004, Fair Value 
Accounting and Financial Stability, pages 7-8. 
 
The third drawback concerns the role of banks as institutions smoothing intertemporal shocks. 
In all likelihood, FFVA will produce more positive results during good times, when asset prices 
are increasing. This would be particularly the case if economic agents have an overly 
optimistic assessment of risks during upturns, reflected in a short-term bias in the calculation 
of expected cash flows. The upward revaluations of assets would be reflected in bank profits 
and bank management could face pressure from shareholders to distribute dividends, including 
unrealised gains on assets remaining in the bank portfolio. 16 Banks’ ability to smooth 
intertemporal shocks would therefore be adversely affected, with a resulting cost in terms of 
both the efficiency and the stability of the financial intermediation function. The CAF, on the 
other hand, applies the principle of prudence which does not recognise unrealized gains that 
may not materialise. In addition, the CAF makes it possible to build up reserves during good 
times, which can then be depleted during bad times. This would translate into lower variability 
in bank income and would allow banks to insure themselves against unforeseen circumstances.  
 
---European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2004, Fair Value 
Accounting and Financial Stability, pages 7-8. 
 
The ABA has strongly opposed fair value accounting for many years. Our position is that: fair 
value is appropriate for trading activities or if an institution is managed on a fair value basis; 
fair value is not the most relevant measurement for most financial institutions, since we are not 
managed on a fair value basis; fair value will actually mislead users of banks' financial 
statements; it would be more appropriate for the FASB to study fair value accounting, 
determine whether fair value disclosures are being used and how they might be improved. 
 
 ---American Bankers Association website 
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 at: http://www.aba.com/Industry+Issues/GR_FASB_PUB.htm 
 
Further concerns have been raised about the potential impact of fair value standards on the 
investment decisions and portfolio composition of life insurance companies. If the movement to 
fair value standards compels life insurance companies to abandon certain asset classes and 
types of illiquid securities because of concerns about pricing problems and procedures, then 
this will be an unwelcome and presumably unintended consequence of the movement to these 
standards. 
 
--- “The Impact of Fair Value Accounting Standards on the Portfolio Composition of Life 
Insurance Companies”, Douglas Fore, TIAA-CREF Institute, May 1, 2003, available at: 
http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/research/papers/050103.html  
 
According to its proponents, an FVA regime may constitute, from a conceptual point of view, 
an alternative approach to reporting financial performance in order to avoid some of the 
problems associated with the current historical cost accounting. One of its main advantages 
would be to enhance the degree of transparency of financial statements. However, this point of 
view remains theoretical due to the absence of homogeneity and therefore comparability in 
FVA methodologies. Furthermore, the possible concrete application of a full FVA regime 
(applying to all assets and liabilities) to the banking sector gives rise to some serious problems 
and concerns. 
 
--- European Central Bank. Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Sector 
 
According to its proponents, an FVA regime may constitute, from a conceptual point of view, 
an alternative approach to reporting financial performance in order to avoid some of the 
problems associated with the current historical cost accounting. One of its main advantages 
would be to enhance the degree of transparency of financial statements. However, this point of 
view remains theoretical due to the absence of homogeneity and therefore comparability in 
FVA methodologies. Furthermore, the possible concrete application of a full FVA regime 
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and concerns. 
 
---European Central Bank. Fair Value Accounting in the Banking Sector 
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Appendix B: An Example of Valuation Under Historical Transactions Accounting 
 
The Coca Cola Company is a good case to demonstrate how a firm can be valued, even though it has a 
balance sheet that does not measure its value very well.  
 At the close of trading on December 8, 2006, The Coca Cola Company’s shares traded at 
$48.91 each. The price-to-book ratio was 6.3, indicating a lot of value missing from the balance sheet, 
largely because U.S. GAAP does not allow Coke’s intangible (brand) assets to be booked to the 
balance sheet. The forward P/E was 19.3, based on analysts’ consensus EPS forecast for 2007. The 
following valuation yields a value of $49.09 per share using only information available in the historical 
cost financial statements. The valuation is crude (and can be refined), but the point is that we get close 
to the market price by using historical cost information and, indeed, with three line items (adjusted for 
taxes): 
 
The Historical Cost Numbers 
Here are the relevant line items for years 2002-2005 (in millions of dollars): 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     2005  2004  2003  2002  
Sales (1)    21,962  21,044  19,656  17,545    
Operating income, after tax (2)   5,065    4,427    4,192    3,841 
Net operating assets (average) (3) 16,985             16,006             15,220             14,526 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Financial Statement Analysis 
From these line items the following valuation inputs can be calculated: 
_______________________________________________________________________  
     2005  2004  2003  2002  
Operating profit margin (2 ÷ 1)           23.1%  21.0%  21.3%  21.9% 
Asset turnover (1 ÷ 3)   1.29  1.31  1.29  1.21 
Average operating profit margin        21.8% 
 
Average asset turnover   1.28 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Center for Excellence in Accounting & Security Analysis 76 
 
Average sales growth rate,  
on a base of  2001 sales  
of $17,354 million)    6.6% 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Valuation Model 
We employ a standard residual income valuation model that calculates missing value in the balance 






Residual Income from Operations2006 = Forecasted Operating Income2006 – (Required  
                                                                                    Return × Net Operating Assets2005) 
Only the residual income from operations is forecasted because residual earnings from interest on net 
debt are usually close to zero. 
 
The Forecast 
As the book value of equity and net operating assets for 2005 are in the 2005 financial statements, we 
need only a forecast of operating income for 2006, the required return, and the growth rate for residual 
income.  
• For the required return, we will use 10% which is approximately the current Treasury rate of 
4.6% plus a risk premium of 5.4%.  
• If both the profit margin and the asset turnover are constant, then residual operating income 
grows at the sales growth rate.60 The condition is approximately satisfied for Coke, so we set 
the growth rate at the sales growth rate of 6.6%. 
• The historical financial statements supply a forecast of operating income and residual operating 
income: 
            Forecasted sales for 2006 = Sales for 2005 × (1 + Average sales growth rate) 
                    = $21,962 × 1.066 
                                                 
60 See S. Penman, Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation. 3rd ed. (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 
2007), page 523. 
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                    = $23,411 
 
            Forecasted operating income for 2006 = Sales for 2006 × Average profit margin 
                   = $23,411 × 0.218 
                   = $5,104 
 
            Forecasted residual operating income for 2006 = $5,104 – (0.10 × 17,113)  
                                = $3,392 
 
The Valuation 




392,3935,15$2005 −+=EquityofValue   
          
           = $115,700 million, or $49.09 per share 
 
The valuation is crude, by design, to make a point. It uses only information in the historical financial 
statements (plus as assumed required return). Yet is comes quite close to the market price of $48.91. 
Adding more information (about sales growth rates) and a different required return will change the 
valuation, but the historical cost financial statements yield considerable insights. Most importantly, it 
challenges the notion that one needs to have fair values on the balance sheet to value equity claims. 
Indeed, it is hard to see how fair value estimates of assets and liabilities would enhance the valuation. 
One could envision putting an estimate of the exit value of its brand asset (probably Level 3) on the 
balance sheet, but would that yield a better valuation? 
 The dummy financial statements for a non-financial firm in Section VII marks trading 
securities and pension assets to fair value, along with marketable securities, with all other items at 
historical cost. If these three items are marked to market (and thus are incorporated in the book value 
of $15,935 million in the value calculation above), the fair value accounting has introduced a real 
efficiency to the valuation task. A fair value asset yields zero expected residual income, so no 
forecasting is needed for these assets. But they enter the valuation in a straight-forward way through 
their book value. As it turns out, Coke’s marketable securities and cash equivalents are at fair value 
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and their pension assets will be under the FASB 2006 rules for reporting pension assets. (The above 
valuation also makes the assumption that financial debt is at market value, a reasonable and standard 
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